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Abstract
Side channels are channels of implicit information ﬂow that can be used to ﬁnd
out information that is not allowed to ﬂow through explicit channels. This thesis
focuses on network side channels, where information ﬂow occurs in the TCP/IP
network stack implementations of operating systems. I will describe three new types
of idle scans: a SYN backlog idle scan, a RST rate-limit idle scan, and a hybrid
idle scan. Idle scans are special types of side channels that are designed to help
someone performing a network measurement (typically an attacker or a researcher)
to infer something about the network that they are not otherwise able to see from
their vantage point.
The thesis that this dissertation tests is this: because modern network stacks have
shared resources, there is a wealth of information that can be inferred oﬀ-path by
both attackers and Internet measurement researchers. With respect to attackers, no
matter how carefully the security model is designed, the non-interference property
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is unlikely to hold, i.e., an attacker can easily ﬁnd side channels of information
ﬂow to learn about the network from the perspective of the system remotely. One
suggestion is that trust relationships for using resources be made explicit all the way
down to IP layer with the goal of dividing resources and removing sharendess to
prevent advanced network reconnaissance. With respect to Internet measurement
researchers, in this dissertation I show that the information ﬂow is rich enough to
test connectivity between two arbitrary hosts on the Internet and even infer in which
direction any blocking is occurring.
To explore this thesis, I present three research eﬀorts:

• First, I modeled a typical TCP/IP network stack. The building process for this
modeling eﬀort led to the discovery of two new idles scans: a SYN backlog idle
scan and a RST rate-limited idle scan. The SYN backlog scan is particularly
interesting because it does not require whoever is performing the measurements
(i.e., the attacker or researcher) to send any packets to the victim (or target)
at all.
• Second, I developed a hybrid idle scan that combines elements of the SYN
backlog idle scan with Antirez’s original IPID-based idle scan. This scan enables researchers to test whether two arbitrary machines in the world are able
to communicate via TCP/IP, and, if not, in which direction the communication is being prevented. To test the eﬃcacy of the hybrid idle scan, I tested
three diﬀerent kinds of servers (Tor bridges, Tor directory servers, and normal
web servers) both inside and outside China. The results were congruent with
published understandings of global Internet censorship, demonstrating that the
hybrid idle scan is eﬀective.
• Third, I applied the hybrid idle scan to the diﬃcult problem of characterizing
inconsistencies in the Great Firewall of China (GFW), which is the largest

vii

ﬁrewall in the world. This eﬀort resolved many open questions about the
GFW.

The result of my dissertation work is an eﬀective method for measuring Internet
censorship around the world, without requiring any kind of distributed measurement
platform or access to any of the machines that connectivity is tested to or from.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A fundamental limitation of most network and Internet measurement techniques is
that, in order to receive the answers in response to probes and measure something
about the network, it is necessary for whomever is carrying out the measurements
to use their own return IP address for all probes sent. Otherwise, the responses
to the probes will not be seen by the measurement machine. For attackers (or,
penetration testers) this means that they must reveal the origin of their scans and it
also means that they can only learn about the network from their own vantage point.
For Internet measurement researchers, this means that we can only learn about the
Internet from the perspective of virtual private services (VPS) or distributed research
environments (e.g. DIMES [62], MLab [63], or PlanetLab [77]) or, in the case of
Internet censorship studies, informed volunteers that are eager to participate in these
studies. In this dissertation, I propose a diﬀerent approach: to learn something about
the network in between A and B, cause A and B to send packets to each other by
sending probes with spoofed return IP addresses, and then use side channels in their
TCP/IP network stacks to infer something about their communication with each
other. Thus, A and B can be virtually any machines on the Internet and need not
be under the researchers’ control. This is important, because the most important
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regions of the Internet to measure regarding Internet freedom issues (e.g., Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and South America) are precisely the same
regions where VPSes and research infrastructure vantage points such as PlanetLab,
MLab, or DIMES are not widely available.
The ﬁrst main chapter of this dissertation focuses on idle scan attacks. An idle
scan is a type of network scan. Network scans can be used to learn valuable information about a network, such as what targets are available and what services they oﬀer.
Idle port scanning uses side-channel attacks to bounce scans oﬀ of a bystander host
to stealthily scan a target IP address or infer IP-based trust relationships between
the bystander and the target IP address. Idle scans can be used to hide the origin of
a scan, to infer trust relationships and ﬁrewall rules, and to reveal hidden networks
and hosts. After Antirez proposed the ﬁrst idle scan in 1998 [12], my dissertation
work was the ﬁrst study to model idle scans, as well as the ﬁrst to discover new idle
scans and apply them to real world problems.
The second and third main chapters of this dissertation focus on applying idle
scans for Internet measurement research. This poses new challenges, because while
idle scan attacks need not respect the network resources of others, idle scans designed
for Internet measurment use by ethical researchers must not ﬁll buﬀers or otherwise
use resources in a way that would deny service to other users. Furthermore, the
Internet is extremely noisy: Internet hosts are rarely completely idle and packet loss
in intercontinental paths is normal.
At a fundamental level, this thesis is about programming a “weird machine” [19]
that was not intended to be programmed. TCP/IP channels are a unique kind
of “weird machine” because information ﬂow must be caused to occurr with carefully crafted sequences of packets. My contribution to the ﬁeld of computer science
touches on one of the most basic research questions of computer science: how to
program machines that are challenging to program. For early machines and today’s
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novel computing paradigms such as biological or quantum computers, the challenges
in programming machines arise from the physical aspects of the machine. For “weird
machines” in the context of computer security and network measurement research,
the challenge arises because the machines that are being programmed (e.g., TCP/IP
network stacks) are not intended to be programmed in the way that my work programs them (e.g., by sending a carefully crafted sequence of packets to perform a
measurement and cause the answer to be sent back to the measurement machine).
There are three main research challenges that I address in this thesis: (1) Can a
host on the Internet be scanned without sending (spoofed) packets to it? (see Chapter 3); (2) Is it possible to ﬁnd out whether packets are being dropped between two
arbitrary IP addresses without having access to either one of them? (see Chapter 4);
(3) To demonstrate the power of our hybrid idle scan: can we detect Internet censorship in China for Tor relays via idle scans and identify geographic correlations?
(see Chapter 5)

1.1

Dissertation Overview

In Chapter 2, I begin by describing our threat model and provide the technical
background of IPID idle scans.
Next, in Chapter 3, I proceed by presenting our results from building a transition
system model of a network protocol stack for an attacker, a victim, and a zombie. I
describe two new idle scans which resulted from our modeling eﬀort, based on TCP
RST rate limiting and SYN backlogs, respectively. Through experimental veriﬁcation
of these attacks, I show that it is possible to scan victims which the attacker is not
able to route packets to, meaning that protected networks or ports closed by ﬁrewall
rules can be scanned [34].
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In Chapter 4, I describe a new form of idle scan known as the hybrid idle scan,
which can be used to remotely detect intentional packet drops on the Internet. That
is, given two arbitrary IP addresses on the Internet that meet some simple requirements, our proposed technique can discover packet drops (e.g., due to censorship)
between the two remote machines, as well as infer in which direction the packet drops
are occurring [33].
After discovering and verifying our novel and practical idle scan, I used it to
characterize observed inconsistencies in the Great Firewall of China (GFW). Past
work has revealed that the ﬁrewall sometimes fails. In other words, sometimes clients
in China are able to reach blacklisted servers outside China. This phenomenon has
not yet been characterized because it is infeasible to ﬁnd a large and geographically
diverse set of clients in China from which to test connectivity. In Chapter 5, I
overcome this challenge using our novel hybrid idle scan technique that is able to
measure the connectivity between a remote client and an arbitrary server, neither of
which are under the control of the researcher performing measurements [35].
After having presented the main contributions of this thesis, Chapter 6 gives
an overview of relevant related work in the ﬁelds of network security and Internet
measurement. Chapter 7 discusses ethical implications of our experiments.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by discussing our results and future work
in the ﬁeld.

4

Chapter 2
Background and Context1

2.1

Interaction Modeling Eﬀorts

Throughout the process of developing this research, we adapt an interaction model
consisting of three hosts: attacker, victim, and zombie 2 . We deﬁne a host to be at
the edge of the Internet, i.e., an end host. Hosts exhibit internal state, such as a SYN
backlog, the IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld variable (IPID), and receive buﬀers for incoming
network traﬃc. Hosts also have ports which can be open, closed, or ﬁltered and their
status does not change during measurements. An open port is a TCP port for which
the host will accept incoming TCP connections. For UDP, open ports simply drop
packets and closed ports respond with ICMP error messages. Filtered ports behave
just like a typical host but for simplicity only ports that are either open or closed
and never ﬁltered are considered in our model. Hosts reply to packets based on rules
that model a typical Linux or FreeBSD network stack. Our model is based on the
1 Since

this research was performed with the help of collaborators, I have adopted using
“we” instead of “I” in Chapters 2 through 6.
2 Antirez [12] who proposed the ﬁrst type of idle scan used attacker, victim, and zombie
that we also use in Chapter 2 and 3. However, we use measurement machine as an attacker,
server as a victim and client as a zombie in Chapter 4 and 5.
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IP protocol and includes TCP (but only up to the point of half-open connections),
ICMP, and UDP.
The SYN backlog of a host is a backlog for half-open TCP connections for which
a SYN/ACK has been sent and the host is waiting for an ACK to complete the threeway handshake. The SYN backlog drops duplicate SYNs for the same IP address
and port pairs. In our model packets are only removed from the SYN backlog when a
TCP RST is received from the source IP address and port of the original SYN packet
(because we only model half-open TCP/IP connections, so there is no ACK for the
third part of a three-way TCP handshake). When the SYN backlog is full, the host
replies with a SYN cookie and drops the SYN. A SYN cookie is a method for sending
an initial sequence number in the SYN/ACK that, when ACKed by the remote host,
contains enough information to complete the connection so that no state about the
half-open connection needs to be kept in memory [16].
The IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld (IPID) is a 16-bit value that is assigned to every IP
packet created by a host in order to uniquely identify fragments of an original IP
packet. Traditionally, this value is sequentially incremented whenever a packet is
sent by the host. However, many operating systems changed the implementation
of the IPID to hold randomly generated values instead. Although in practice, as
shown in [40], many operating systems still employ incrementally increasing IPIDs.
An incrementally increasing IPID is required for the IPID idle scan to work which
will be explained in the following section.
Figure 2.1 shows the basic deﬁnition of an idle scan that we use for our model.
The diagram contains four boxes, three of which are the attacker, the zombie, and
the victim host. The fourth box describes the absence of a host so all packets to
it are dropped. A solid arrow denotes that the source host can send packets to the
destination using its own return IP address. A dashed arrow indicates that the source
host can send a packet to the destination using any return IP address other than its

6
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No host
Attacker

Victim

Zombie

Figure 2.1: Basic deﬁnition of an idle scan. Dashed lines represent IP communication
with spoofed source IP addresses whereas solid lines represent IP communication with
unspoofed IP addresses.

own. The salient feature of this deﬁnition of an idle scan is that the attacker cannot
send packets to the victim using its own return IP address. This entails that the
victim never sends any packets to the attacker, and that the attacker therefore only
ever receives packets from the zombie, since the victim and zombie only ever reply
to packets using their real IP address as the return address.
Our goal is to ensure that the network satisﬁes the non-interference property,
i.e., an attacker cannot gain any information if this property holds. A network that
satisﬁes the non-interference property is deﬁned as: for any possible sequence of
packets that the attacker can send to the victim and zombie, the sequence of packets
the attacker receives in response is identical regardless of whether the victim’s port is
open or closed. This deﬁnition models the desired behavior that the attacker cannot
gain any information about the target victim’s port.
We reach our goal by implementing two possible scenarios faced by the attacker
which the attacker is attempting to distinguish and thus gain information about the
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victim. In each scenario, there is a victim and a zombie whose behavior and initial
state are identical (except for either the status of the target port on the victim or
censorship between victim and zombie, of course), but whose behavior and internal
state over time can diﬀer between scenarios through certain sequences of events due
to the port status of the target port. The attacker sends identical packets in both
scenarios.
Attacker

PacketA2

PacketA1

Victim 1

Victim 2

Zombie 1

Zombie 2

Figure 2.2: Overview of our model (the IP address with no host that drops all packets
is excluded from this ﬁgure for clarity).

Figure 2.2 gives an overview of our interaction model for testing non-interference
properties of network stacks for idle scans. The status of the target port or the existence of censorship between zombie and victim is modeled as two diﬀerent scenarios.
Victim 1 and Zombie 1, for example, exist in scenario 1 where the target port on
Victim 1 is open. Victim 2 and Zombie 2 exist in scenario 2 where the target port
on Victim 2 is closed. The attacker can forge any arbitrary sequence of packets,
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but it must forge identical packets in both scenarios. The hosts in the diﬀerent scenarios can respond diﬀerently and contain diﬀerent internal state. PacketA1 and
PacketA2 are the sequence of packets the attacker receives in scenario 1 and scenario
2, respectively.
In our model, the attacker can choose any arbitrary sequence of packets nondeterministically that do not violate the deﬁnition of an idle scan. Furthermore, the
attacker does not need to reply to packets; the fact that the model allows the attacker
to send arbitrary packets covers all possibilities for replies. For the destination and
return IP addresses of a packet, the attacker can choose among its own IP address,
that of the victim or the zombie, or an IP address with no live host (that simply
drops all packets). The only constraint is that the attacker cannot send a packet
to the victim with its own IP address as the return IP address as this violates the
deﬁnition of an idle scan.
The attacker can distinguish between TCP segments employing SYN cookies and
segments using regular SYN/ACKs that it receives in our model. This assumption
holds in practice because of the statistical properties of the initial sequence numbers
of SYN cookies and the fact that SYN cookies are never retransmitted whereas
regular SYN/ACK segments are.
The attacker can further choose any value for the IP protocol (TCP, UDP, or
ICMP), TCP ﬂags, source and destination ports, validity of checksums, and so on.
Every packet that the attacker forges is forwarded to the appropriate host in both
scenarios.
In Chapter 3, we demonstrate the existence of two novel idle scans and explore
their properties by model checking for a non-interference property over this model.
One idle scan is based on a host’s SYN backlog and the other on RST or ICMP
rate limitations. The latter requires relatively high packet rates or the use of the
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frequently ﬁltered ICMP protocol, so for Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we focus on
the SYN backlog idle scan combined with IPID idle scan. We also demonstrate both
attacks using real machines and give more technical details about the protocol stacks
of various versions of Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows.

2.2

IPID Idle Scans

Similar to virtually all side channel attacks, idle scans are associated with shared,
limited resources. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of the original idle scan discovered
by Antirez in 1998 [12] and presented on the bugtraq mailing list. The technique is
described in more detail by Lyon [58].

Open Scenario

Closed Scenario

Zombie2 Victim2
IPID =1380

Attacker Victim1
SYN/A

CK
SYN/A

CK

RST

IPID =1380

RST
SYN

SYN

IPID =1381

CK
SYN/A
RST
IPID =1382

Zombie1

IPID =1381

SYN/A

K

C
SYN/A

CK

RST

RST
IPID =1382

IPID =1383

Time

Figure 2.3: The original IPID idle scan discovered by Antirez in 1998. The attacker
is able to scan a victim’s port without directly communicating with it.
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In the original form of the idle scan (shown in Figure 2.3), the attacker queries the
zombie for IP packet responses and observes the sequence of IPIDs in the zombie’s
responses. The attacker then sends one or more SYN packets to the victim on the
target port to be scanned with the return IP address pointing to the zombie and the
return port pointing to a closed port on the zombie. If the victim replies to the SYN
with a SYN/ACK, meaning the victim’s port is open, then the zombie will reply to
the victim with a TCP reset (RST) and the attacker will observe a discontinuity in
the sequence of IPIDs that it receives from the zombie. If the victim’s port is closed,
the SYN is dropped or replied to by the victim with a RST, which the zombie simply
drops and no discontinuity is observed by the attacker. Thus, the attacker is able
to infer the port status of the victim without revealing their return IP address to
the victim. Furthermore, the attacker is able to infer trust relationships between the
victim and the zombie. For example, the attacker might infer that the victim only
accepts connections from a particular trusted subnetwork by using a zombie on that
subnetwork.
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Chapter 3
Idle Scanning and
Non-interference Analysis of
Network Protocol Stacks
As mentioned in Chapter 1, by scanning the network, the attacker is able to gain
valuable information about the hosts that exist and the services they oﬀer, infer
IP-based trust relationships between hosts that are enforced by ﬁrewall rules and
router tables, and collect other information that they can use in the next stage of
attack. In this chapter, we show that model checking can be a useful framework
for predicting and mitigating attacker capabilities. In idle scans, an attacker scans
a victim without sending packets to that victim using its own return IP address.
The model of idle scans that we describe in this chapter led to the discovery of two
new forms of idle scan.1 One of these, based on SYN backlog structures that are
common to all modern network stacks, gives an attacker capabilities beyond the one
1 These

counterexamples were discovered during the process of deciding what details to
include in the model, so resulted from the modeling eﬀort but were not unexpected results
from the model checker itself.
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previously known form of idle scan in the literature. The other one is based on RST
rate limiting that is limit a host to only send a ﬁnite number of RST per second.
Finally, we demonstrate that if a distinction between trusted and untrusted hosts
were made explicit in the lower layers of the network protocol stack, then separate
RST rate limitations and a split SYN backlog structure eliminates these attacks in
our model of network stacks, which is complex enough to model all of the details of
each attack.

3.1

Introduction

The two new forms of idle scan that have resulted from the model checking eﬀort
presented in this chapter are based on RST rate limiting and SYN backlogs, respectively. These were discovered during the process of building the model and manifest
as counterexamples to a non-interference property that are produced by the model
checker. In the RST rate limiting counterexample, the zombie in this case is a
FreeBSD machine that limits the number of RST packets that it will send in a given
time period. The attacker can infer the port status of the victim by testing the rate
at which the zombie will reply with RST packets, the details of this are in Section 3.4.
The SYN backlog counterexample is diﬀerent from the existing IPID-based idle
scan, which is described in Chapter 2.2, in that the attacker never sends (spoofed)
packets to the victim. Instead the attacker forges SYN packets from the victim to
the zombie, and the zombie sends a SYN/ACK to the victim and places these SYN
packets in its SYN backlog (a data structure for holding half-open TCP connections
for which a SYN/ACK has been sent but an ACK response has yet to arrive). Because RSTs and ICMP errors from the victim will cause this SYN backlog entry to
be removed, the attacker can eﬀectively perform a SYN/ACK scan of the victim
without needing the ability to route packets to the victim. The attacker does this
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by testing the state of the SYN backlog by sending SYNs with its own return IP
address and viewing the SYN/ACK responses. The replies of the victim probes can
be inferred from the attacker’s ability to get SYN backlog entries for its own SYNs.
This makes possible testing for the liveness of IP addresses on protected networks
with a rudimentary form of OS detection, and even port scanning on certain types
of hosts on a port that is entirely blocked by a ﬁrewall. More details are given in
Section 3.4.
Like virtually all side-channel attacks, idle scans are associated with shared, limited resources. Because these resources generally cannot be made unlimited, we
recommend in light of our results that trust relationships between hosts be made
explicit to those hosts all the way down to the IP layer. Currently the only distinction at the TCP and IP layers is subnetworks, which do not necessarily correspond
to the IP-based trust relationships between hosts that are enforced by ﬁrewall rules
and routing tables. Trusted hosts can be hosts protected by the same ﬁrewall or
that have special trust relationships in the packets they can route to each other. By
making a distinction between trusted and untrusted hosts non-interference can be
achieved by statically dividing shared resources, eﬀectively eliminating idle scans.
We verify non-interference for our model with separate RST rate limitations using
symbolic model checking. Then we demonstrate that our split SYN backlog structure using bounded model checking to a depth of 1000 transitions has no violations
of non-interference. This means that no practical attack for this counterexamples
exists within the constraints of our model.
This chapter is organized as follows. Our model is described in Section 3.3,
followed by a description of the counterexamples discovered during the process of
building the model and some experimental results from their implementation in Section 3.4. We demonstrate that non-interference is achievable by distinguishing between trusted and untrusted hosts in Section 3.4.3. This is followed by discussion
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and future work in Section 3.5. Chapter 6 provides more background and related
works.

3.2

Background

Non-interference [41] is a widely used concept of information ﬂow security that has
seen wide application for proving security properties of programs. The works that
are most related to ours in this space are those that treat non-interference as two
or more separate scenarios that must produce the same result from the attacker’s
view for non-interference to be demonstrated, e.g., TightLip [112] or the work of
McCamant and Ernst [66, 67]. We apply non-interference to network stacks in this
chapter. Non-interference proved to be a very fruitful model of information ﬂow
in this context, but for future work that might consider packet loss, packet delay,
and other such factors, alternatives such as non-deducibility [94] may be necessary.
For the modeling eﬀort presented in this work, which is based on an abstracted
model of real networks that does not include packet loss and delay, non-interference
proved to be a very useful property because it can be speciﬁed with Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL). Treating the problem as a covert channel problem and studying object
storage [49] and timing channels [108] is an attractive approach, but covert channel
models assume collusion of the sender and receiver of information and do not capture
in their models the sequences of events necessary to describe idle scans in a natural
way.
The model checker that we chose for our study is the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [15]. SAL provides a SAT-based bounded model checker that allows for
counterexamples to be easily interpreted as a trace through the states of the model,
or, in our case speciﬁcally, a sequence of packets. SAL also provides a BDD-based
symbolic model checker. Model checking has been applied to many properties of
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network protocols and their implementations where speciﬁc bugs lead to security
vulnerabilities or availability issues, (e.g., [31, 81, 43]). We have particularly patterned our analysis following Rushby’s tutorials for modeling the Needham-Schroeder
protocol [83] to identify Lowe’s bug and the fault-tolerant algorithm for maintaining interactive consistency (Byzantine agreement) [84] as the transition systems for
these problems seem similar to the ones for modeling port scanning and side-channel
attacks in a protocol stack. Our results demonstrate that model checking is also
useful for studying information ﬂow on networks, particularly in this chapter within
the context of idle port scans.

3.3

Formalizing Non-interference Analysis of Idle
Scans

After establishing our network stack model that is described in Section 2.1 , in this
section we describe more details and its implementation in SAL, and ﬁnally we list
simplifying assumptions of the model.

3.3.1

SAL for Modeling, Counterexamples, and Veriﬁcation

We model the network stack as a transition system. At an informal, high level,
a transition system speciﬁes computation as a sequence of transitions in a state
machine. A state is given by the values of the local variables used to describe
transitions. A transition system has an initial state. For every transition, there
is an optional guard, which when true in the current state, leads the computation
from the current state to the next state. For a nondeterministic transition system,
multiple transitions may be triggered and one transition is randomly selected. This
is repeated and the computation terminates if no guard is true in the current state.
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Dijkstra’s guarded command language [27] is an example of a formalism for specifying
transitions.
We used SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory) for specifying the transition system
and analyzing its properties. SAL is a language and a tool kit for specifying transition
systems and analyzing them using model checking. SAL provides support for a suite
of tools which have been successfully used for analyzing protocols and distributed
algorithms (see [86]).
Figure 3.1 shows the outline of our SAL code for the model. Ellipses indicate
where detailed code has been omitted, the full model is 895 lines of SAL code.
For a transition step, a nondeterministic choice is made between the attacker,
victim, or zombie. If the attacker is chosen, it forges a nondeterministic packet,
which can be a “drop” packet that has no eﬀect. This packet is placed in the receive
queue of the destination IP address. If the victim or zombie is chosen, it removes the
next packet from its FIFO receive queue and replies based on its internal state and
conﬁguration. The functions ProperReply and UpdateSynbacklog are responsible
for choosing the packet to reply with, if any, and any updates to the host’s internal
state (speciﬁcally the RST counter and SYN backlog). Note that these are pure
functions and do not update any state themselves.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show how the ProperReply and UpdateSynbacklog functions
are used. A transition has a guard, e.g., “(z1.fullness /= 0 AND z2.fullness /=
0 ) -->”, which is a quantiﬁer-free formula specifying a condition on the current
state and must hold before the transition is executed, and then a formula relating the
current state with the next state. An example of such a formula is “z1’.fullness =
z1.fullness - 1”, where z1’ is the variable in the next state and z1 is the variable
in the current state. In this example the variable will be decremented by 1 in the
next state.
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When the guard on a transition for the zombie or victim ﬁres, that host must
remove a packet from its queue and then reply and update its state in both scenarios.
UpdateSynbacklog returns not only the new state of the SYN backlog, but also
a variable called .synPIsThere which can take on the values put, notexist, or
exist. This return value is passed to ProperReply, which needs to know if a SYN
packet was put in an entry in the SYN backlog, no entry was found for it because
the SYN backlog is full, or it already existed in the SYN backlog. In this way
ProperReply knows whether to send a SYN/ACK, send a SYN cookie, or drop the
packet, respectively, if the packet is a SYN.
For example, if the zombie in one of the scenarios receives a SYN packet, it calls
UpdateSynbacklog to determine the new state of the SYN backlog and what will
happen to the packet. If the internal state of the zombie indicates that there is a
free entry in the SYN backlog, the fact that the SYN will be placed in the SYN
backlog and the new status of the SYN backlog are returned by this function. Then
ProperReply is called with this information as an argument, and this function will
determine that the proper reply is a normal SYN/ACK, with the destination IP
address as the source of the SYN, valid checksums, etc.
Another example is that a host (a victim or zombie) receives a SYN/ACK.
UpdateSynbacklog returns the current state (i.e., no changes will be made to
the SYN backlog state) and then ProperReply will be called and will ignore
.synPIsThere because the packet is not a SYN. The return value of ProperReply
depends on the RST counter. If the RST counter is non-zero the return value of
ProperReply will be a RST packet that the zombie will use for a reply and a reduced RST counter. If the RST counter is already zero, ProperReply will return a
drop packet and zero still for the RST counter. All possible TCP, UDP, or ICMP
packets and their corresponding replies are enumerated in ProperReply based on
the reply that a typical network stack would send.
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By forcing the zombies or the victims in both scenarios to reply at the same
time step, the model stays in sequence. If a host in one scenario (e.g., the victim
in the closed port scenario) replies to a packet whereas the corresponding host in
the other scenario (e.g., the victim in the open port scenario) drops the packet, a
“drop” entry is inserted in the destination host’s queue as a ﬁller and eventually
ignored. This ensures that the packets that are received by the attacker vary only
when non-interference is violated, i.e., only when the sequence diverges.
SAL supports a suite of tools; the ones most relevant for the analysis discussed
in this chapter include a deadlock checker, a symbolic model checker for ﬁnite state
systems based on the CUDD BDD package, and a bounded model checker based
on the Yices SAT solver. Properties of a transition system are speciﬁed in Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL). Our analysis involved using properties of the form G(α),
where α is a quantiﬁer-free, modality free formula expressed using state variables,
to mean that α holds in every state of the transition system. The non-interference
property is speciﬁed as:

� G(PacketA1 = PacketA2)
This means that the sequence of packets the attacker receives in response to its
probes from the zombie in the ﬁrst scenario is always identical to the response from
the zombie in the second scenario.
We have used SAL’s bounded model checker for ﬁnding counterexamples as it is
depth-ﬁrst and explicitly enumerates states. SAL’s symbolic model checker, which
is exhaustive, is useful for ﬁnding smaller counterexamples as well as for proving
properties of interest, which are often diﬃcult to do by explicit state enumeration
model checkers. A useful comparative study of exhaustive symbolic model checkers
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and explicit state enumeration model checkers is in [22] for protocol analysis and
controllers.

3.3.2

Assumptions to Reduce the Number of Model States

A number of assumptions were made to keep our model simple. Our strategy was to
start with a simple model and introduce additional complexity into the model if no
counterexamples are generated, and ensure that the abstractions we made caused no
loss of generality that would exclude potential counterexamples.
A major abstraction in the model considers the proper reply to SYN/ACK packets
to be “drop” for open ports and RST for closed ports. In reality, network stacks that
respond diﬀerently to SYN/ACKs on open vs. closed/ﬁltered ports typically respond
with RSTs or ICMP and have diﬀerent rate limits per port. Since the lower rate
limit (typically ICMP) will cause drops before the higher rate limit, without loss of
generality, we can consider open ports to simply drop SYN/ACK packets from the
initial state. This is equivalent to assuming that the attacker immediately exhausts
the lower rate limit.
We also exclude ICMP and UDP from the split SYN backlog version of our model.
Since ICMP host error packets have the same eﬀect on the SYN backlog as RSTs,
and other ICMP and UDP packets make no relevant changes to the destination host’s
TCP state, ICMP and UDP do not aﬀect the non-interference property for the SYN
backlog structure. Invalid checksums in packet headers are also excluded, because
they are dropped without aﬀecting the state of the destination host in all cases.
Another major abstraction is that each of the two buﬀers in our split SYN backlog
has only a single entry. There are three reasons why only a single entry in the SYN
backlog is necessary in the model:

20

Chapter 3. Idle Scanning and Non-interference Analysis of Network Protocol Stacks
• Pending entries in the SYN backlog with source IP addresses and ports (possibly spoofed by the attacker) that correspond to invariant ports (that have the
same status in both scenarios) cannot cause divergence in the internal state
of any of the hosts in the two scenarios. Thus, no more than one such SYN
backlog entry at a time can be useful for creating a counterexample.
• Even though RST rate limiting is performed separately for open and closed
ports, the rate limit value stored by any host cannot be caused to diverge on
invariant ports. Only the target port on the victim can cause divergence. Since
only one such port exists, only one SYN backlog entry at a time can be useful
for creating a counterexample. If we had not received a counterexample under
this assumption, we would have incrementally allowed more entries in the SYN
backlog.
• While the single entry is full, the SYN cookies generated in response to dropped
SYN packets can only cause internal state diﬀerences if sent to the target port
on the victim. If this is the case then the entry in the SYN backlog cannot also
be a SYN packet with the victim IP address and target port, since duplicate
SYNs are ignored by the SYN backlog. Thus, one SYN backlog entry per trust
level (trusted and untrusted) is general enough to handle all of the cases of any
number of SYN backlog entries.
Because of the above simpliﬁcation of making the SYN backlog have a single
entry for each trust level, we modeled only three ports without loss of generality.
Port 1 is prohibited (e.g. by a ﬁrewall rule) to the attacker for the split SYN backlog
implementation, meaning that the attacker cannot send packets to port 1. This was
done so that we could include the RST rate limitation, which has important interactions with the SYN backlog, without receiving the RST rate limit counterexample.
Port 1 is closed in both scenarios for the zombie; however, for the victim, it is open
in one scenario and closed in the other. In other words, port 1 is the target port for
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the attacker to get information. Port 2 is closed and port 3 is open on both hosts
in both scenarios. Because closed ports are equivalent in terms of their responses, a
single closed port per host is equivalent to any number of closed ports. Because the
SYN backlog has a single entry and open ports only have diﬀerent behaviors based
on the status of the SYN backlog, a single open port per host is also equivalent to
any number of open ports.
In real SYN backlog implementations, there is a timeout after which SYNs that
have not become fully open TCP connections are dropped. Because our model allows
the attacker to remove any entry from the SYN backlog at any time via a RST
packet (which is also possible in reality for Linux SYN backlog implementations),
our model need not incorporate this timeout. Also, RST rate limiting is done per
a time period in reality. A ﬁxed limit of RSTs for an unbounded amount of time is
a generalization of this that does not exclude any counterexamples because for any
violation of non-interference based on a rate limit a single time period is enough to
create a counterexample.

3.4

Finding and Ameliorating Idle Scans

In this section, we describe the counterexamples that our modeling eﬀort produced
and give experimental results of an implementation of these counterexamples to
demonstrate that they can indeed be used to do idle port scans.

3.4.1

Discovering Counterexamples

We now describe the two counterexamples that were discovered during the process
of developing the model.
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Port
1

Zombie status
Open

2
3

Closed
Open

Victim Status
Open in scenario 1,
closed in scenario 2
Closed
Open

Table 3.1: Ports and their status in our model.

RST Rate Limiting Counterexample
When we applied SAL’s bounded model checker to a simpler model in which the
SYN backlog did not play any role, for the property “� G(PacketA1 = PacketA2)”
SAL identiﬁed a counterexample with RST counter set to 3 in the initial state. We
simpliﬁed the model further by reducing the initial value of RST counter to 1 and
still received a counterexample. The counterexample in this case was found much
more quickly, at depth 5 in the transition system.

Open Scenario

Closed Scenario

Zombie2 Victim2
SYN

1

RST count=1

2
2

Attacker Victim1
2

SYN
1

CK 1
SYN/A
R ST

Zombie1

1

R ST
2

RST count=1

1

SYN/A

2

CK

SYN/
A CK

RST count=0 2

2

R ST
2

2

RST count=0

Time

Figure 3.4: RST rate limiting counterexample.

This counterexample is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The ﬁgure shows the sequence
of packets for the open vs. closed scenarios that that attacker can send to distinguish
between the scenarios. Note that the attacker sends the same sequence of packets in
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both cases. Dashed lines are spoofed packets (for Figure 3.4 the packets are spoofed
so that they appear to come from the zombie). The numbers at the bases and heads
of the arrows represent the source or destination port number, respectively. The
RST count state for a period of time is the state of that variable for each scenario.
In this example the attacker wants to discern the port status (open or closed)
of port 1 on the victim. Port 2 on the zombie is closed. The packets the attacker
sends are identical in both scenarios. The attacker cannot see the packets that are
sent between the victim and zombie or zombie and victim. The port status must
be inferred by the diﬀerence in the expected packet sequence that the attacker will
see between the two scenarios. First, the attacker forges a SYN to the victim on
the target port that appears to be from the zombie with return port 2. If the target
port on the victim is open, it will respond to the zombie with a SYN/ACK on the
zombie’s closed port 2, causing the zombie to send the victim a RST and decrement
its RST count. If the port is closed, the victim will respond to the zombie with a
RST which the zombie ignores. Next, the attacker sends a SYN/ACK packet, using
its own return IP address, to the closed port on the zombie. If the attacker receives
a RST in response, then it can infer that the victim target port status is closed since
an open port would have caused the zombie to have already reached its RST rate
limit.

SYN backlog Counterexample

For the second case, we tried a more complex model that included a SYN backlog. We
started with a SYN backlog of size 2, then simpliﬁed it further to size 1, and SAL’s
bounded model checker still identiﬁed the counterexample to the non-interference
property as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: SYN backlog counterexample.

The relevant state in this case is the number of pending SYN/ACK entries in the
SYN backlog, with a maximum value of 1 in our model. The notable thing about
this form of idle scan is that the attacker never sends any packets to the victim, not
even packets with spoofed return IP addresses. Instead, the attacker sends a SYN to
the zombie on an open port, with the return IP address of the victim and the return
port as the target port. The zombie places this SYN packet in the SYN backlog,
which in our model has only a single entry, and sends a SYN/ACK response to the
victim. If the victim target port is closed it will send a RST in response, which
causes the zombie to remove the relevant SYN backlog entry so that there is now a
free entry in the SYN backlog. An open target port on the victim will simply drop
the SYN/ACK from the zombie, so that the SYN backlog of the zombie remains
full since the zombie is still waiting for a response to the SYN/ACK. The attacker
can then infer the status of the zombie’s SYN backlog, and therefore the victim port
status, by sending a SYN to the zombie with the attacker’s own return IP address.
A regular SYN/ACK means the SYN backlog entry was free, a SYN cookie indicates
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that it was full.
Note that responses to SYN/ACKs on open, closed, or ﬁltered ports vary for
diﬀerent operating systems, but all that matters is that for open vs. closed or open vs.
ﬁltered the response diﬀers in some way under certain conditions. More discussion
of the possibilities for this is in Section 3.4.2. The SYN backlog counterexample
makes it possible to, e.g., port scan a network on a port that is blocked for the entire
network from outside the ﬁrewall. Imagine in Figure 3.5 that the zombie and victim
are behind a ﬁrewall and the attacker is outside the ﬁrewall. Even if the ﬁrewall
drops all incoming packets with destination port, e.g., 22 for Secure Shell (SSH), the
attacker can scan port 22 on the network by using other open ports. Also, there may
be ﬁrewall rules that enforce that only trusted machines (e.g., the zombie) can route
packets to the victim. In this case the victim might be an internal database server
and the zombie is the web server interface to the database, for example. Information
about what ports the victim has open might give the attacker an idea of whether
compromising the zombie to subsequently get access to the victim is worth the eﬀort
and risk. It might also be that the attacker can route packets to the victim, but
not on the target port. For example, many machines leave certain ports open only
for their backup servers that contact them nightly. Or, the system administrator
might only allow incoming SSH sessions on their critical servers from their own oﬃce
machines and not from other IP addresses. Knowing these kinds of trust relationships
and exploiting them to ﬁnd out more about the victim machines can be very valuable
to an attacker.
For each host, both the SYN backlog and the reset rate limiting variables constitute shared, limited resources, which are the sources of violations of non-interference
in our two counterexamples.
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3.4.2

Experimental Conﬁrmation of Counterexamples

We implemented both counterexamples to verify that these two new forms of idle
scan that resulted from the modeling eﬀort were possible for real hosts. Our results
presented in this section demonstrate that the diﬀerences in the sequence of packets
the attacker sees translate from the abstract notion of non-interference in our model
to diﬀerences that can be seen in real network packet traces. Our implementations
of the two idle scans are not optimized for speed or stealth, nor do they account for
packet loss or packet delay, but in this section we discuss the practicality of these
two forms of idle scan and conclude that they are both practical.

Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we set up VirtualBox [5] virtual machines connected using
IPv4 on two diﬀerent subnetworks with TUN/TAP interfaces. The attacker machine
was the host, and one subnet contained a Linux kernel 2.4 host (Fedora Core 1)
which served as the zombie for the SYN backlog idle scan implementation. The
other subnet contained a Windows XP host with no service packs, a Linux kernel
2.6 host (CentOS 5.2), and a FreeBSD 7.1.1 host. The latter served as the zombie
for RST rate limiting idle scan implementation. IP forwarding between these two
subnetworks was performed by the host. Packets were generated and captured by
separate threads using the Perl Net::RawIP and Net::Pcap libraries, respectively.

RST Rate Limiting Idle Scan Implementation
In our transition system model, RSTs are limited to a ﬁnite number for inﬁnite time.
For a real FreeBSD system, RSTs are limited to a default of 200 per second, with
separate limitations for open and closed ports. Our implementation sends 2000 each
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Port status
Open
Closed

Mean
1552.1
2000

Std. dev.
47.0
0

Min.
1429
2000

Max
1634
2000

Table 3.2: Results from RST rate limiting idle scan implementation.

of two diﬀerent types of packets, each at a rate of 180 per second, to the victim and
FreeBSD zombie, respectively. One type of packet is spoofed SYNs to the victim on
the target port that appear to be from the zombie on a port that is closed on the
zombie. The other is SYN/ACKs from the attacker to the zombie, which the zombie
should reply to with RSTs. If the zombie is sending RSTs at a rate of 180 per second
to the victim in response to the victim’s SYN/ACKs (meaning the victim target port
is open), this should interfere with the rate at which the zombie sends RSTs to the
attacker. Thus the number of RSTs the attacker receives in our experiment can be
used to infer the port status of the target port on the victim. We repeated the RST
rate limiting idle scan experiment 700 times each for an open and closed port on the
victim. The victim was a Linux kernel 2.6 virtual machine. The host-based ﬁrewalls
on both machines were disabled, although for the victim the idle scan works whether
the host-based ﬁrewall is enabled or not. For FreeBSD, RST rate limiting does not
apply to ﬁltered ports. The pf host-based ﬁrewall is disabled by default for FreeBSD
installations.
The results from our RST rate limiting idle scan are shown in Table 3.2, where
the results are based on the number of RSTs the attacker receives. When the victim
port is closed, the attacker receives all 2000 RST responses from the zombie. When
the victim port is open, the attacker receives at most 1634 RSTs. Thus, determining
if the target port is open or closed is straightforward for idle scans based on RST
rate limiting.
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SYN Backlog Idle Scan Implementation
SYN backlog implementations vary for diﬀerent operating systems2 . While the SYN
backlog idle scan is possible using virtually any host as a zombie, the simplest network stack to use as a zombie is Linux kernel 2.4. Linux kernel 2.4 uses a simple
buﬀer for the SYN backlog, with between 128 and 1024 entries depending on the
memory available on the system. Our Linux kernel 2.4 virtual machine zombie had a
SYN backlog size of 128, but Linux enforces a rule that only three fourths of the SYN
backlog can contain SYN packets from hosts that have not demonstrated their liveness in the recent past by completing a fully open TCP connection. This eﬀectively
reduces the SYN backlog size to 97. We did not enable SYN cookies, which are disabled by default in Linux. The attack works basically the same whether or not SYN
cookies are enabled. We ran two separate sets of experiments for the SYN backlog
idle scan implementation, one to demonstrate that it is possible for the attacker to
detect the presence of live machines and perform a rudimentary form of operating
system detection, and another to demonstrate that under certain circumstances the
attacker can infer the port status of a target port on a particular victim IP address.
For all experiments, 100 data points were generated for both open and closed port
scenarios.
For checking for liveness, we scanned four diﬀerent IP addresses. One is a default
FreeBSD 7.1.1 machine (with the pf host-based ﬁrewall disabled, as is the default),
another is a Windows XP machine with no service packs (with Windows ﬁrewall
disabled, as is the default), and a third is a Linux kernel 2.6 machine (CentOS 5.2,
with iptables enabled, as is the default). The fourth IP address has no live host so
all packets are simply dropped. Forging packets from random return IP addresses
on these victims is very likely to send SYN/ACKs to closed or ﬁltered ports, so we
2 In

this chapter, our analysis was performed for Red Hat based distributions circa 2010,
so may not generalize to entire Linux kernel branches.
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choose random return ports for all spoofed SYNs where the attacker uses the victim
as the return IP address. Varying this return port number is important because if the
return port is not diﬀerent then the spoofed SYNs will have the same IP addresses
and ports for both the destination and source and the SYN backlog will drop such
duplicates. Both RSTs and ICMP errors cause their corresponding entries to be
removed from the SYN backlog when received by the zombie.
Because Linux responds to SYN/ACKs on ﬁltered ports at a very low rate (about
10 per second) with ICMP host prohibited packets, FreeBSD responds to SYN/ACKs
on closed ports at a rate of at most 200 per second, Windows responds on closed ports
with RSTs at an unlimited rate—and IP addresses without live hosts simply cause
SYN/ACKs to be dropped—it is possible for the attacker to idle scan a subnetwork
and infer something about the operating systems that the live hosts discovered have
installed. To scan a single IP address, our implementation sends 50 spoofed SYNs
(that appear to be from the victim), then 50 each of spoofed SYNs and SYNs where
the attacker uses their own return IP address, and then 200 more spoofed SYNs, all
at a rate of 1000 per second. It then sends 200 each of spoofed SYNs and SYNs
where the attacker uses their own return IP address at a rate of 400 per second. The
number of SYNs where the attacker uses their own return IP address and receives a
SYN/ACK response can then be used to infer the liveness and operating system of
the IP address. The results from this experiment are shown in Table 3.3, where the
results are based on the number of SYN/ACKs the attacker receives (note that for
Linux kernel 2.4 network stacks SYN/ACKs are retransmitted ﬁve times until they
time out after 190 seconds).
Under certain circumstances, it is also possible to port scan speciﬁc ports on
a particular IP address using a SYN backlog-based idle scan. Speciﬁcally, if the
response or rates diﬀer for open vs. closed or ﬁltered ports on the victim then
scanning a target port is possible. Examples of this are FreeBSD with the pf host-
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Host
Not live
Linux 2.6
FreeBSD
Windows XP

Mean
109.1
126.9
300
460.3

Std. dev.
7.4
6.3
0
11.9

Min.
96
111
300
435

Max
123
138
300
477

Table 3.3: Results from SYN backlog idle scan implementation for liveness and
operating system.

based ﬁrewall disabled, where open ports and closed ports are rate-limited separately,
or Linux hosts with the iptables host-based ﬁrewall enabled and an open port that
does not use the stateful module of iptables.
To test the FreeBSD example, we developed a SYN backlog-based idle scan that
simultaneously sends 20000 spoofed SYN packets (with random return ports that
are closed on the zombie) as quickly as possible while sending, at half the rate,
alternating spoofed SYNs with the target port on the victim as the source port and
valid SYNs with the return address of the attacker. Because closed ports on the
victim are rate limited due to the spoofed SYNs with random return ports coming
from the zombie, the spoofed SYNs with the target port on the victim as their return
port will quickly ﬁll the SYN backlog if the target port is also closed and cause fewer
entries to be free for non-spoofed attacker SYNs, therefore causing the attacker to see
fewer SYN/ACKs in response. If the target port is open, the open port sends more
RSTs before rate limiting begins meaning that more SYN backlog entries remain free
and the attacker sees more SYN/ACKs. The results of this experiment are shown
in Table 3.4, where the results are based on the number of SYN/ACKs the attacker
receives. Some data points for both closed and open ports were thrown out due
to failures of the Python pcap library at high packet rates. Packet loss due to the
high rates could only make the distributions more similar, not less, because more
packets are sent over the TUN/TAP interface for the open port scenario. Thus,
the distributions for open and closed ports are clearly diﬀerent. A two-sampled,
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Port status
Open
Closed

Mean
262.1
218.0

Std. dev.
41.8
39.3

Min.
120
68

Max
447
318

Table 3.4: Results from SYN backlog idle scan implementation for port scanning
FreeBSD.
Port status
Open
Closed

Mean
482.4
427.8

Std. dev.
3.3
3.4

Min.
474
417

Max
489
435

Table 3.5: Results from SYN backlog idle scan implementation for port scanning
Linux.

unpooled t-test (which assumes neither known variances nor equal variances) for
these two sets of data gives a t score of 7.71 with 197 degrees of freedom, which
corresponds with a p-score of 0.999999999999696 meaning that a null hypothesis
that the two distributions have an equal mean is rejected with very high conﬁdence.
For port scanning Linux-based victims, the idle scan ﬁrst sends 96 ﬁller SYNs
to ﬁll all but one entry in the SYN backlog. SYN/ACK replies to ﬁller SYNs are
not counted in the results. Then it alternates, at an overall rate of 100 packets per
second, spoofed SYNs with the return IP address of the victim and return port of
the target port, ﬁller SYNs, and probe SYNs. Table 3.5 shows the results of these
experiments, where the results reﬂect the number of SYN/ACK responses to probe
SYNs.

Stealth and Eﬃciency
Our idle scan implementations in this section are intended to show that the abstract
counterexamples that resulted from our modeling eﬀort were real divergences in real
network stacks that could be exploited by the attacker for idle scans. Since the diver-
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gences are based on rates in real network stacks we used hypothesis testing to show
this. We only report a t-score and p-score for one set of experiments (the SYN backlog idle scan implementation for port scanning FreeBSD) because the distributions
of the results for other experiments were so diﬀerent that their high t-scores led to
p-scores that were within ﬂoating point rounding error of 1.0. Our implementations
of these idle scans were designed for this hypothesis testing and therefore are not
optimized for attacker stealth or eﬃciency in carrying out the scan. For assessing
the practicality of these idle scan techniques, we will now comment on stealth and
eﬃciency.
For the RST rate limiting idle scan, the attacker cannot perform the idle scan
without sending more than 200 SYN/ACKs to the zombie either directly or indirectly.
However, the attacker need not send SYNs to the victim (spoofed from the zombie)
at half this rate. It is possible to, e.g., send SYNs to the victim at a rate of 20 per
second and send SYN/ACKs (or any packet that will elicit a RST) to the zombie at
195 per second. Theoretically, the mutual information between the victim port status
and the sequence of packets the attacker sees is non-zero even if the attacker sends
only a single spoofed SYN to the victim, and even when packet loss is accounted
for. Thus the attacker has a fair amount of ﬂexibility in terms of trading oﬀ speed of
the scan vs. stealth for packets it sends to the victim. Furthermore, sending SYNs
simultaneously to multiple victims and multiple ports and measuring the zombie
responses in the aggregate can increase the eﬃciency of the scan if the distribution
of expected closed vs. open victim ports diverges from an equal distribution. To see
this, consider the extreme case where a large subnetwork has only a single host with
an open port, something similar to a binary search could greatly reduce the amount
of time necessary for the scan in this case.
For the SYN backlog idle scans, which are more powerful in terms of the new
capabilities they oﬀer attackers beyond the currently known idle scan technique,
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there is a wider range of eﬃciency and stealth tradeoﬀs that the attacker can make.
Furthermore, unlike ICMP IPID- or RST rate limit-based idle scans, virtually any
modern network stack that oﬀers any type of protection against SYN ﬂooding can
be used as a zombie. We chose to use a low-memory Linux kernel 2.4-based zombie
for our experiments due to its simplicity and small SYN backlog size, but larger SYN
backlog sizes or more complex SYN backlog implementations are also easily exploited
for SYN backlog idle scans. The SYN backlog only needs to be almost full for SYN
backlog idle scans to work, and SYNs for half-open connections take 190 seconds
to timeout in Linux by default. So even for high-memory Linux 2.4 machines with
1024 SYN backlog entries (of which 769 are used, compared to 97 for 128-entry SYN
backlogs), the rate necessary to create the conditions for an idle scan only increases
from 0.5 SYNs per second from the attacker to the zombie to about 4.1 SYNs per
second (these rates keep the buﬀer almost full despite the timeouts). Once these
conditions are created, the attacker eﬀectively can do a SYN/ACK scan of the victim
host or network at the cost of two packets sent per SYN/ACK query and three more
generated as responses. It also does not matter whether or not the zombie implements
SYN cookies, since SYN cookies are never retransmitted (compared to typically three
to ﬁve retransmissions of regular SYN/ACKs for various zombie conﬁgurations) and
also have easily identiﬁable statistical anomalies in their initial sequence numbers.
Some SYN backlog implementations that are not simple buﬀers like Linux 2.4 may
make SYN-backlog idle scans slightly more diﬃcult, but still possible and relatively
eﬃcient. For example, the FreeBSD SYN cache implementation [55] uses a SYN
backlog with 512 buckets that each have 30 entries and are chosen uniformly at
random using a hash of the IP address/port pairs and a host-generated secret. This
mechanism is designed to stop denial-of-service, not idle scans. It creates some
equivocations that can reduce the amount of information ﬂow the attacker can exploit
for idle scans but the attacker can still perform the scan relatively eﬃciently even
with FreeBSD zombies. We did not explore the SYN backlog implementations of
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Linux kernel 2.6 or Windows hosts as part of this work. All modern network stacks
must have some form of SYN backlog for reliability purposes and a limit on this
resource to prevent denial-of-service. Thus, only by making this resource non-shared
is non-interference to prevent idle scans possible, and the current OSI network stack
model with TCP/IP does not make the necessary trust distinctions to split the SYN
backlog. Thus, virtually every end host machine that the attacker can route to at
least one open port on is a potential zombie.
The rate at which the attacker must send packets to the zombie for a SYN backlog
idle scan, and therefore the stealth of the scan, depends on the attacker’s goals. If
the zombie is a Linux kernel 2.4 machine and the attacker wants only to check the
liveness of a range of IP addresses on the victim network, then between 0.5 and 4.1
packets per second plus the probes themselves is suﬃcient. Note that, in terms of
stealth, it is also relevant that the attacker need not send any packets to the victim
for this form of idle scan, not even packets with spoofed return addresses.
For detecting the operating system of a victim host or scanning individual ports
on the victim, higher rates are necessary. Detecting a Linux machine on the victim
network and port scanning it can easily be done at between 10 and 20 packets per
second. We also discovered during our experiments that, at least for Linux kernel
2.4 hosts, it is easy for the attacker to not only remove their own packets from the
SYN backlog manually, but any packet that they have spoofed, using spoofed RSTs.
This is because only the IP address and port pairs are checked, the sequence and
acknowledgment numbers for RSTs are ignored when deciding whether to drop an
entry from the SYN backlog on the zombie. Thus, the attacker has a high degree
of control over the SYN backlog status of the victim. Packet delay, packet loss, and
interference from other machines that contact the zombie can easily be accounted for
in this way, and the aggregate eﬀect of scanning multiple victims at a time mentioned
above also applies to SYN backlog idle scans. One possible avenue for future work
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would be to model the capabilities of this attack as a Markov Decision Process and
discern tight bounds on numbers of packets and rates needed for diﬀerent attacker
goals.
In terms of the practicality of our attacks, the ability to scan ﬁrewalled ports and
discover machines on protected networks that the attacker cannot route packets to
certainly underscores the need for good ingress ﬁltering and DMZ management. Our
attacks are applicable in all three of the following scenarios: when the victim and
zombie are on the same subnet and communicate using ARP1 , when the victim and
zombie are within the same network domain but on diﬀerent subnets, and when the
victim and zombie are geographically separated by some distance on the Internet.
The attacker can be inside or outside the network domain of the zombie and victim.
Thus, many possibilities for network inference arise. For example, the attacker can
infer when a host opens ports only to other particular machines, such as a backup
server or network administrator. While many network conﬁgurations prevent IP
address spooﬁng, which is essential for both attacks described in this chapter, idle
scans are a very general technique that can apply in a variety of scenarios.

3.4.3

Ensuring Non-interference Using SAL Model Checker

Based on our experimental results from implementing the two counterexamples as
idle scan attacks, it is apparent that RST rate limiting and the SYN backlog interact
in complex ways and cannot be considered separately. Thus we chose to leave RST
rate limiting in the model for verifying non-interference of the split SYN backlog.
It is well-known that verifying properties using a model checker is much more
diﬃcult than ﬁnding a counterexample. We abstracted the model down to the simplest form that produces both counterexamples, and attempted to prove the noninterference property for cases where the shared, limited resources were split based on
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trust relationships and therefore no longer shared. The zombie and victim consider
each other trusted and the attacker untrusted. For the RST rate limiting counterexample, the hosts have separate RST count RST counters for trusted vs. untrusted
hosts, and the SYN backlog is removed. For the SYN backlog counterexample, we
implemented a split SYN backlog structure with separate SYN backlog buﬀers for
trusted vs. untrusted hosts.
In the ﬁrst case, we removed the SYN backlog and focused only on the RST rate
limitation counter example. Since symbolic model checkers are known to be better for
verifying properties in contrast to explicit state enumeration based bounded-model
checkers, we used SAL’s symbolic model checker. It veriﬁed the property that:

� G(PacketA1 = PacketA2)
This veriﬁcation completed in a little over 5 minutes.
Encouraged by this result, we introduced the SYN backlog back into the model.
The symbolic model checker ran out of memory on a machine with 16GB of memory
after three days. We then ran the bounded model checker up to depth 1000 (to mean
that all sequences of transitions of length ≤ 1000 are checked for counterexamples),
and the model checker did not report any counterexample, which is very encouraging.
This means that the attacker cannot violate non-interference with any idle scan where
less than 1000 transitions occur. The SYN backlog counterexample to our shared
SYN backlog implementation required only 5 transitions. Informally, this result
means that there exists no attack, even with only a single entry in the SYN backlog,
where the attacker can violate non-interference with 1000 or fewer packets being
generated by the attacker or by the zombie and victim’s responses. One avenue of
possible future work would be to explore alternatives to symbolic model checking
for the split SYN backlog, including verifying the property through k-induction [26].
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Attempting a proof by induction on an induction-based theorem prover such as ACL2
or RRL may also prove fruitful.

3.5

Concluding Remarks and Future Work

We modeled idle scans for modern network stacks using transition systems and analyzed them using model checking. This modeling eﬀort led to the discovery of two
new forms of idle scan, each of which was associated with a shared, limited resource.
Our results demonstrate that non-interference for network protocol stacks warrants
further study. We discovered two new forms of idle scan, one of which gives the
attacker capabilities that no current attacker port scanning capabilities below layer
7 (the application layer) provide. We demonstrated in this chapter that it is possible
for an attacker to port scan a network from outside the ﬁrewall on a port that the
ﬁrewall blocks, for example. We also showed that this form of idle scan, based on
SYN backlogs, can be used for a rudimentary form of operating system detection.
In light of these results, a more formal treatment of information ﬂow in networks
is needed so that we can better understand advanced idle scans, both for existing
networks and in future protocol designs.
We discussed the stealth and eﬃciency of the idle scans in Section 3.4.2. While
it is clear both that the attacks are practical and that certain defenses exist in some
situations, a more thorough treatment of possible scans and defenses to detect or
eliminate them is needed.
Using SAL’s model checkers, we were able to identify counterexamples to noninterference, in the form of idle scans, from our formal model of a network stack as a
transition system. After ﬁxing the model by splitting limited resources and separating them for trusted vs. untrusted hosts we are able to verify the non-interference
property for the RST rate limit case. However, we were only able to show the non-
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interference property with both RST rate limiting and a SYN backlog up to 1000
transitions. Verifying the non-interference property for this more general ﬁx using
a model checker remains a challenge. While non-interference and model checking
proved useful for studying speciﬁc shared resources, we were not able to build a
model complex enough to discover unexpected counterexamples.
Our model of network stacks was at the level of abstraction of sequences of packets. A richer model that includes memory usage, packet loss, and packet delay would
likely produce more counterexamples to the non-interference property for idle scans.
Thus we propose that trust relationships be made explicit all the way down to the
IP layer in future protocol designs. Because all resources are inherently limited, giving protocol implementations a mechanism that can help divide these resources and
remove sharedness is the only way to address the advanced network reconnaissance
attacks of the future. Our results in Section 3.4.3 demonstrated that non-interference,
which eﬀectively eliminates idle scans, is achievable by statically dividing resources
based on trust relationships.
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Network_Protocol_Stack : CONTEXT =
BEGIN
% Type Declarations
Protocol : TYPE = {tcp, icmp, udp, invalidProtocol};
IP: TYPE = [1..5]; % 1 is Attacker, 2 is Victim, 3 is Zombie
PortStatus: TYPE = {open, closed, filtered};
TCP_Flag : TYPE = {syn, fin, synack, rst, drop};
Port: TYPE = [1..3]; % each host has 3 ports
Type_ICMP: TYPE = [1..5];
Packet: TYPE = [# sip_IP : IP, dip_IP : IP, ihl_IP : ValidOrInvalid, ...
Host : TYPE = [# ip : IP , portstatus : array Port of PortStatus, ...
...
% Functions
ProperReply(Packet, PortStatus, Rst_counter): Packet, Rst_counter;
% This function returns the proper response to a given packet
% and a reduced Rst_counter if a RST is sent.
...
UpdateSynbacklog (Packet, Synbacklog): Synbacklog, SynPIsthereOrNot;
% This function returns the new state of the SYN backlog, which can change
% for SYNs or RSTs, and a value indicating if the SYN already exists, was
% dropped, or was placed in the SYN backlog
...
main : MODULE =
BEGIN
% Variable Declarations
GLOBAL v1 : Host % victim 1
GLOBAL v2 : Host % victim 2
GLOBAL z1 : Host % zombie 1
GLOBAL z2 : Host % zombie 2
...
LOCAL PacketA1 : Packet % Packets sent to attacker in scenario 1
LOCAL PacketA2 : Packet % Packets sent to attacker in scenario 2
...
% Initialization Section
...
% Transition Section
TRANSITION
[
(v1.fullness /= QueueSize OR z1.fullness /= QueueSize )-->
% Attacker creates a packet and puts it in queues of either
% v1 and v2 or z1 and z2
...
[]
(v1.fullness /= 0 AND v2.fullness /= 0 ) -->
% v1 and v2 pop a packet and call ProperReply and UpdateSynbacklog to
% choose a proper reply and update their internal state.
...
[]
(z1.fullness /= 0 AND z2.fullness /= 0 ) -->
% z1 and z2 reply and update their state
...
]
END;
theorem1: THEOREM main |- G( PacketA1 = PacketA2 );
END

Figure 3.1: Outline of SAL code for the network protocol stack model.
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...
[]
(z1.fullness /= 0 AND z2.fullness /= 0 ) -->
% z1 and z2 reply and update their state
...
collector_1’.packet = z1.queueOfHost[1] ;
(FORALL (j: FullnessOfQueue ): z1’.queueOfHost[j-1] = z1.queueOfHost[j]);
z1’.fullness = z1.fullness - 1;
...
temp’= UpdateSynbacklog(...);
z1’.synbacklog= temp’.host.synbacklog;
...
response’ = ProperReply(collector_1’, z1.portsstatus[collector_1’.packet.dport],
temp’ ) ;
...
% Do the same for z2, which may have a different packet in its queue
collector_2’.packet = z2.queueOfHost[1] ;
(FORALL (j: FullnessOfQueue ): z2’.queueOfHost[j-1] = z2.queueOfHost[j]);
z2’.fullness = z2.fullness - 1;
...

Figure 3.2: Overview of what happens when a transition ﬁres.
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...
% Functions
ProperReply(Packet, PortStatus, Rst_counter): Packet, Rst_counter;
% This function returns the proper response to a given packet
% and a reduced Rst_counter if a RST is sent.
IF ...
...
ELSIF ( Packet.protocol_IP = tcp AND (Packet.seqNum_TCP = known AND Packet.ack_TCP = known )
AND Packet.flag_TCP = syn AND ps = open AND Packet.synPIsThere2 = put )
THEN
packetOut with .packet.sip_IP := Packet.dip_IP
with .packet.sport := Packet.dport
with .packet.dip_IP := Packet.sip_IP
with .packet.dport := Packet.sport
with .packet.flag_TCP := synack
with ...
...
UpdateSynbacklog (Packet, Synbacklog): Synbacklog, SynPIsthereOrNot;
% This function returns the new state of the SYN backlog, which can change
% for SYNs or RSTs, and a value indicating if the SYN already exists, was
% dropped, or was placed in the SYN backlog
IF ( ... AND Packet.flag_TCP = syn AND Host.synQeueEntries[1]=valid
... AND Packet.sip_IP = host.synbacklog[1].sip_IP ...)
THEN # Ignore duplicate SYNs, i.e., that already exist in the SYN backlog
synCollOut with .synPIsThere := exist
ELSIF ( ... )
THEN synCollOut
with .synPIsThere := put
with .host.synbacklog[1] := synCollIn.packet
...

Figure 3.3: Structure of the UpdateSynbacklog and ProperReply functions.

42

Chapter 4
Detecting Censorship via TCP/IP
Side Channels
Tools for discovering intentional packet drops are important for a variety of applications, such as discovering the blocking of Tor by ISPs or nation states [13]. However,
existing tools have a severe limitation: they can only measure when packets are
dropped in between the measurement machine and an arbitrary remote host. The
research question we address in this chapter is: can we detect packet drops between
two hosts without controlling either of them and without sharing the path between
them?
In this chapter, we describe a method for remotely detecting intentional packet
drops on the Internet using idle scans. That is, given two arbitrary IP addresses
on the Internet that meet some simple requirements, our proposed idle scan can
discover packet drops (e.g., due to censorship) between the two remote machines,
as well as infer in which direction the packet drops are occurring. The only major
requirements for our approach are a client with a global IP Identiﬁer (IPID) and a
target server with an open port. We require no special access to the client or server.
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Our method is robust to noise because we apply intervention analysis based on an
autoregressive-moving-average (ARMA) model. Also, our method uses a low packet
rate that does not ﬁll shared resource and therefore it is non-intrusive.

4.1

Introduction

As shown in Section 2.2, Antirez [12] proposed the ﬁrst type of idle scan, which we
call an IPID idle port scan. In this type of idle scan an “attacker” (which we will
refer to as the measurement machine in our work) aims to determine if a speciﬁc
port is open or closed on a “victim” machine (which we will refer to as the server )
without using the attacker’s own return IP address. The attacker ﬁnds a “zombie”
(client in this chapter) that has a global IP identiﬁer (IPID) and is completely idle.
In this chapter, we say that a machine has a global IPID when it sends TCP RST
packets with a globally incrementing IPID that is shared by all destination hosts.
This is in contrast to machines that use randomized IPIDs or IPIDs that increment
per-host. More details are in Section 2.2. Nmap [58] has built-in support for antirez’s
idle scan, but often fails for Internet hosts because of noise in the IPID that is due to
the zombie sending packets to other hosts. Our method described in this chapter is
resistant to noise, and can discover packet drops in either direction (and determine
which direction). Nmap cannot detect the case of packets being dropped from client
to server based on destination IP address, which our results demonstrate is a very
important case.
Two other types of idle scans were presented in Chapter 3, including one that
exploits the state of the SYN backlog as a side channel. Our method is based on a
new idle scan technique that can be viewed as a hybrid of the IPID idle scan and the
SYN backlog idle scan from Chapter 3. Whereas the SYN backlog idle scan required
ﬁlling the SYN backlog and therefore causing denial-of-service, our technique uses
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a low packet rate that does not ﬁll the SYN backlog and is non-intrusive. The
basic insight that makes this possible is that information about the server’s SYN
backlog state is entangled with information about the client’s IPID ﬁeld. Thus, we
can perform both types of idle scans (IPID and SYN backlog), to detect drops in
both directions, and our technique overcomes the limitations of both by exploiting
the entanglement of information in the IPID and treating it as a linear intervention
problem to handle noise characteristic of the real Internet.
Eﬀectively, by using idle scans our method can turn approximately 1% of the
total IP address space into measurement machines that can be used as vantage
points to measure IP-address-based censorship, without actually gaining access to
those machines. We can achieve this because of information ﬂow in their network
stacks.
In this chapter, we oﬀer several major contributions:
• A non-intrusive method for detecting intentional packet drops between two IP
addresses on the Internet where neither is a measurement machine.
• An Internet measurement study that shows the eﬃcacy of the method.
• A model of IPID noise based on an autoregressive-moving-average (ARMA)
model that is robust to autocorrelated noise.
Source code and data are available upon request, and a web demonstration version of the hybrid idle scan is at http://spookyscan.cs.unm.edu. The types of
measurements we describe in this chapter raise ethical concerns because the measurements can cause the appearance of connection attempts between arbitrary clients
and servers. In China there is no evidence of the owners of Internet hosts being persecuted for attempts to connect to the Tor network, thus our measurements in this
chapter are safe. However, we caution against performing similar measurements in
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other countries or contexts without ﬁrst evaluating the risks and ethical issues. More
discussion of ethical issues is in Chapter 7.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: After describing the implementation of our method in Section 4.2, we present our experimental methodology for the
measurement study in Section 4.3. This is followed by Section 4.4, which describes
how we analyze the time series data generated by a scan using an ARMA model.
Results from the measurement study are in Section 4.5, followed by discussions and
conclusions in Section 4.6. Related work is discussed in Chapter 6.

4.2

Implementation of Hybrid Idle Scan

In order to determine the direction in which packets are being blocked, our method is
based on information ﬂow through both the IPID of the client and the SYN backlog
state of the server, as shown in Figure 4.1. Our implementation queries the IPID
of the client (by sending SYN/ACKs from the measurement machine and receiving
RST responses) to create a time series to compare a base case to a period of time
when the server is sending SYN/ACKs to the client (because of our spoofed SYNs).
We assume that the client has global IPIDs and the server has an open port.
Global IPIDs were explained in Section 4.1. The SYN backlog is a buﬀer that
stores information about half-open connections where a SYN has been received and
a SYN/ACK sent but no ACK reply to the SYN/ACK has been received. Halfopen connections remain in the SYN backlog until the connection is completed with
an ACK, aborted by a RST or ICMP error, or the half-open connection times out
(typically between 30 and 180 seconds). The SYN/ACK is retransmitted some ﬁxed
number of times that varies by operating system and version, typically three to six
SYN/ACKs in total. This SYN backlog behavior on the server, when combined with
the global IPID behavior of the client, enables us to distinguish three diﬀerent cases
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Figure 4.1: Three diﬀerent cases that our method can detect. MM is the measurement machine.

(plus an error case):
• Server-to-client-dropped: In this case SYN/ACKs are dropped in transit
from the server to the client based on the return IP address (and possibly other
ﬁelds like source port), and the client’s IPID will not increase at all (except for
noise). See Figure 4.2.
• No-packets-dropped: In the case that no intentional dropping of packets is
occurring, the client’s IPID will go up by exactly one. See Figure 4.3. This
happens because the ﬁrst SYN/ACK from the server is responded to with a
RST from the client, causing the server to remove the entry from its SYN
backlog and not retransmit the SYN/ACK. Censorship that is stateful or not
based solely on IP addresses and TCP port numbers may be detected as this
case, including ﬁltering aimed at SYN packets only. Also, if the packet is
not dropped, but instead the censorship is based on injecting RSTs or ICMP
errors, it will be detected as this case. Techniques for distinguishing these other
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Figure 4.2: Example IPID diﬀerence time series’ for three separate experiments that
lead to detection of the Server-to-client-dropped case. Note the high amount
of noise in the third experiment. Our ARMA modeling is able to detect this case
correctly even in the presence of such high noise.

possibilities are left for future work.
• Client-to-server-dropped: In this case RST responses from the client to the
server are dropped in transit because of their destination IP address (which
is the server).

When this happens the server will continue to retransmit

SYN/ACKs and the client’s IPID will go up by the total number of transmitted
SYN/ACKs including retransmissions (typically three to six). See Figure 4.4.
This may indicate the simplest method for blacklisting an IP address: null
routing.
• Error: In this case networking errors occur during the experiment, the IPID
is found to not be global throughout the experiment, a model is ﬁt to the data
but does not match any of the three non-error cases above, the data is too
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Figure 4.3: Example IPID diﬀerence time series’ for three separate experiments that
lead to detection of the No-packets-dropped case. Note the high amount of noise
in the second experiment. Our ARMA modeling is able to detect this case correctly
even in the presence of such high noise.

noisy and intervention analysis (see Section 4.4) fails because we are not able
to ﬁt a model to the data, and/or other errors.

Noise due to packet loss and delay or the client’s communications with other
machines may be autocorrelated. The autocorrelation comes from the fact that the
sources of noise, which include traﬃc from a client that is not idle, packet loss,
packet reordering, and packet delay, are not memoryless processes and often happen
in spurts. The accepted method for performing linear intervention analysis on time
series data with autocorrelated noise is ARMA modeling [18], which we describe in
Section 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Example IPID diﬀerence time series’ for three separate experiments that
lead to detection of the Client-to-server-dropped case.

4.3

Experimental Setup

All measurement machines were Linux machines connected to a research network
with no packet ﬁltering. Speciﬁcally, this network has no stateful ﬁrewall or egress
ﬁltering for return IP addresses.
One measurement machine was dedicated to developing a pool of both client and
server IP addresses that have the right properties for use in measurements. Clients
were chosen by horizontally scanning China and other countries for machines with
global IPIDs, then continually checking them for a 24-hour period to cull out IP
addresses that frequently changed global IPID behavior (e.g., because of DHCP),
went down, or were too noisy. A machine is considered to have a global IPID if its
IPID as we measure it by sending SYN/ACKs from alternating source IP addresses
and receiving RSTs never incrementing outside the ranges [−40, 0) or (0, 1000] per
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second when probed from two diﬀerent IP addresses. This range allows for non-idle
clients, packet loss, and packet reordering. It is possible to build the time series in
diﬀerent ways where negative IPID diﬀerences are never observed, but in this study
our time series was the diﬀerences in the client’s IPIDs in the order in which they
arrived at the measurement machine. Our range of [−40, 0) or (0, 1000] is based on
our observations of noise typical of the real Internet. The IPID going up by 0 is a
degenerate case and means the IPID is not global.
Servers were chosen from three groups: Tor directory authorities, Tor bridges, and
web servers. The ten Tor directory authorities were obtained from the Tor source
code and the same ten IPs were tested for every day of data. Three Tor bridges were
collected daily both through email and the web. Every day seven web servers were
chosen randomly from the top 1000 websites on the Alexa Top 1,000,000 list [7]. All
web server IPs were checked to make sure that they stood up for at least 24 hours
before being selected for measurement. Furthermore, we checked that the client and
server were both up and behaving as assumed between every experiment (i.e., every
ﬁve minutes).
A round of experiments was a 24-hour process in which measurements were carried out on the two measurement machines. Each 24-hour period had 22 hours of
experiments and 2 hours of down time for data synchronization. For each measurement period on each of the two machines performing direct measurements, ten server
machines and ten client machines from the above process were chosen for geographic
diversity: 5 from China, 2 from countries in Asia that were not China, 1 from Europe, and 2 from North America. IP addresses were never reused except for the Tor
directory authorities, so that every 24-hour period was testing a set of 20 new clients,
10 new servers, and the 10 directory authorities.
For each of the twenty clients and twenty servers geographical information provided by MaxMind was saved. MaxMind claims an accuracy of 99.8% for identifying
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the country an IP address is in [64]. For each of the twenty server machines, a series
of SYN packets was used to test and save its SYN/ACK retransmission behavior for
the analysis in Section 4.4.
Every hour, each of our two main measurement machines created ten threads.
Each thread corresponded to one client machine. Each thread tested each of the
ten server IP addresses sequentially using our idle scan based on the client’s IPID.
No spoofed SYNs were sent to the server during the ﬁrst 100 seconds of a test,
and spoofed SYNs with the return IP address of the client were sent to the server
at a rate of 5 per second for the second 100-second period. Then spoofed RST
packets were sent to the server to clear the SYN backlog and prevent interference
between sequential experiments. A timeout period of sixty seconds was observed
before the next test in the sequence was started, to allow all other state to be
cleared. Each experiment lasted for less than ﬁve minutes, so that ten could be
completed in an hour. Every client and server was involved in only one experiment
at a time. Each client/server pair was tested once per hour throughout the 24-hour
period, for replication and also to minimize the eﬀects of diurnal patterns. Source
and destination ports for all packets were carefully chosen and matched to minimize
assumptions about what destination ports the client responds on. Speciﬁcally, source
ports for SYN packets sent to the server (both spoofed SYNs and SYNs with the
measurement machine’s IP address as the return IP address for testing) were chosen
from the same range as the destination ports for SYN/ACKs sent to the client
(always strictly less than 1024). We did not ﬁnd it necessary to hold the source port
for SYN/ACKs sent to the client to be always equal to the open port on the server,
but this is possible.
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4.4

Analysis

In this section, we set out our statistical model for our time series data. We then
describe our process for outlier removal and for statistically testing if and in which
direction packet drops are occurring.
We model each time series y1 , . . . , yn as a linear regression with ARMA errors,
a combination of an autoregressive-moving-average (ARMA) model with external
linear regressors. ARMA models are used to analyze time series with autocorrelated
data and are themselves a combination of two models, an autoregressive (AR) model
and a moving-average (MA) model.
An AR model of order p speciﬁes that every element of a time series can be
written as a constant plus the linear combination of the previous p elements:
yt = c + zt + φ1 yt−1 + · · · + φt−p yt−p
where zt is a white noise series. An MA model of order q speciﬁes that every element
of a time series can be written as a constant plus the linear combination of the
previous q white-noise terms:
yt = c + zt + θ1 zt−1 + · · · + θt−q zt−q
Intuitively, each element is linearly related to the previous random “shocks” in the
series. An ARMA(p, q) model combines an AR model of order p and an MA model
of order q:
yt = c + zt +

p
�
i=1

φi yt−i +

q
�

θi zt−i

i=1

We use a linear regression with ARMA errors to model our time series data. This
speciﬁes that every element in a time series can be written as a constant plus the
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C→S
None
S→C
x1
x2
x3
t1 t2

t3

Figure 4.5: For a server that retransmits r − 1 SYN/ACK’s, each case can be expressed as the linear combination of regressors x1 , . . . , xr ; shown is when r = 3 with
SYN/ACK transmissions responding to the ﬁrst spoofed SYN occurring at t1 , t2 ,
and t3 . C→S indicates client-to-server, and S→C indicates server-to-client.

linear combination of regressors x1 , . . . , xr with an ARMA-modeled error term:

yt = c +

r
�

βi xit + et ,

i=1
p

et = z t +

�
i=1

φi et−i +

q
�

θi zt−i

i=1

We use the regressors xi for intervention analysis, i.e., for analyzing our experimental eﬀect on the time series at a speciﬁc time.
For each experiment, we pick regressors according to which times the server
(re)transmits SYN/ACK’s in response to SYN’s. For a server that (re)transmits
r SYN/ACK’s in response to each SYN, we have r regressors. We call time t1 the
time of the ﬁrst transmission in response to the ﬁrst of our spoofed SYN’s, and we
call ti+1 the time the server would send the ith retransmission in response to that
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SYN. Then we deﬁne regressor xi as the indicator variable


1 if ti ≤ j and either j < ti+1 or i = r
xij =

0 otherwise

In other words, x1 is zeros until the time the server transmits the ﬁrst SYN/ACK

then ones until the server begins retransmitting SYN/ACK’s. The remaining xi are
zeros until the time the server would begin retransmitting its ith SYN/ACK then
ones until if/when the (i + 1)th SYN/ACK’s would begin being retransmitted. This
deﬁnition allows us to model any of the possible level shifts in any case of packet
drop as a linear combination of all xi . See Figure 4.5 for an illustration.
We choose ARMA orders p and q by performing model selection over time series
elements y1 , . . . , yt1 . We ﬁnd the p ≤ 7 and q ≤ 7 for the ARMA(p, q) model
that maximizes the corrected Akaike information criterion, a metric which rewards
models that lose less information but penalizes models overﬁtted with too many
parameters [44]. It is given by
AICC = −2 ln L + 2k +

2k(k + 1)
,
n−k−1

where here the number of parameters k is p + q + 2 and where L is the estimated
maximum likelihood over all φi and θi .
After p and q are chosen, we then simultaneously ﬁt all φi , θi , and βi of our linear
regression model with ARMA errors over the entire time series y1 , . . . , yn corresponding to the estimated maximum likelihood.
After ﬁtting parameters, we remove outliers that might be caused by, e.g., spikes
in network traﬃc that may hamper our analysis. We use the λ̂2,T test statistic
proposed by Chang et. al [20] with signiﬁcance α = 0.05. After removing outliers, we
iteratively reﬁt the φi , θi , and βi parameters and test for outliers until no additional
outliers are removed.
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For intervention analysis, we use hypothesis testing over the value of βr to determine if packets are dropped and in which direction. If we send s spoofed SYN’s,
without noise, we would expect βr to equal one of the following: 0 for the case where
packets are dropped from the server to client, s for the case where no packets are
dropped, or rs for the case where packets are dropped from the client to server. One
might pick two thresholds, k1 = s/2 in between the ﬁrst two cases and threshold
k2 = (1 + r)s/2 between the last two cases; however, for the second threshold, we
instead choose k2� = min(2s, k2 ) to be more robust to, e.g., packet loss. Then we determine the case by a series of one-sided hypothesis tests performed with signiﬁcance
α = 0.01 according to the following breakdown:
• Server-to-client-dropped if we reject the null hypothesis that βr ≥ k1 .
• No-packets-dropped if we reject the null hypotheses that βr ≤ k1 and that
βr ≥ k2� .

• Client-to-server-dropped if we reject the null hypothesis that βr ≤ k2� .
• Error if none of the above cases can be determined.

4.5

Results

Table 4.1 shows results from 5 days of data collection, where S → C is Serverto-client-dropped, None is No-packets-dropped, C → S is Client-to-serverdropped, and Error is Error. CN is China, Asia-CN is other Asian countries, EU
is Europe, and NA is North America. For server types, Tor-dir is a Tor directory
authority, Tor-bri is a Tor bridge, and Web is a web server.
Our expectation would be to observe Server-to-client-dropped for clients in
China and Tor servers because of Winter and Lindskog’s observation that SYN/ACKs
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Client,Server
CN,Tor-dir
Asia-CN,Tor-dir
NA,Tor-dir
EU,Tor-dir
CN,Tor-bri
Asia-CN,Tor-bri
NA,Tor-bri
EU,Tor-bri
CN,Web
Asia-CN,Web
NA,Web
EU,Web
All Web
All Tor-bri
All Tor-dir

S → C (%)
2200 (73.04)
0 (0.00)
1 (0.07)
2 (0.28)
1012 (58.91)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
28 (2.15)
1 (0.17)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
29 (1.01)
1012 (27.12)
2203 (35.09)

None (%)
19 (0.63)
1171 (96.38)
1217 (90.69)
695 (97.89)
565 (32.89)
626 (80.88)
657 (78.21)
313 (78.25)
995 (76.30)
569 (97.43)
606 (93.37)
305 (90.24)
2475 (86.09)
2161 (57.90)
3102 (49.40)

C → S (%)
504 (16.73)
1 (0.08)
49 (3.65)
2 (0.28)
31 (1.80)
9 (1.16)
30 (3.57)
9 (2.25)
36 (2.76)
1 (0.17)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
37 (1.29)
79 (2.12)
556 (8.85)

Error (%)
289 (9.59)
43 (3.54)
75 (5.59)
11 (1.55)
110 (6.40)
139 (17.96)
153 (18.21)
78 (19.50)
245 (18.79)
13 (2.23)
43 (6.63)
33 (9.76)
334 (11.62)
480 (12.86)
418 (6.66)

Table 4.1: Results from the measurement study.

are statelessly dropped by the “Great Firewall of China” (GFW) based on source IP
address and port [107]. We would expect to see No-packets-dropped for most web
servers from clients in China, unless they host popular websites that happen to be
censored in China. Similarly, in the expected case we should observe No-packetsdropped for clients outside of China, regardless of server type. We expect a few
exceptions, because censorship happens outside of China and because the GFW is
not always 100% eﬀective. In particular, Tor bridges are not blocked until the GFW
operators learn about them, and some routes might not have ﬁltering in place. Our
results are congruent with all of these expectations.
In 5.9% of the client/server pairs we tested, multiple cases were observed in the
same day. In some cases it appears that noise caused the wrong case to be detected,
but other cases may be attributable to routes changing throughout the day [75].
That the data is largely congruent with our expectations demonstrates the eﬃcacy
of the approach, and some of the data points that lie outside our expectations have
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patterns that suggest that a real eﬀect is being measured, rather than an error. For
example, of the 28 data points where web servers were blocked from the server to
the client in China, 20 of those data points are the same client/server pair.
38% of the data we collected does not appear in Table 4.1 because it did not pass
liveness tests. Every 5-minute data point has three associated liveness tests. If a
server sends fewer than 2.5 SYN/ACKs in response to SYNs from the measurement
machine, a client responds to less than

3
5

of our SYN/ACKs, or a measurement

machine sending thread becomes unresponsive, that 5-minute data point is discarded.
Two out of ten Tor directory authorities never retransmitted enough SYN/ACKs
to be included in our data. Of the remaining eight, two more account for 98.8% of
the data points showing blocking from client to server. These same two directory
authorities also account for 72.7% of the Error cases for directory authorities tested
from clients in China, and the case of packets being dropped from server to client
(the expected case for China and the case of the majority of our results) was never
observed for these two directory authorities.
When Winter and Lindskog [107] measured Tor reachability from a virtual private
server in China, there were eight directory authorities at that time. One of the eight
was completely accessible, and the other seven were completely blocked in the IP
layer by destination IP (i.e., Client-to-server). In our results, six out of ten are
at least blocked Server-to-client and two out of ten are only blocked Client-toserver (two had all results discarded). Winter and Lindskog also observed that Tor
relays were accessible 1.6% of the time, and we observed that directory authorities
were accessible 0.63% of the time. Our results have geographic diversity and their
results can serve as a ground truth because they tested from within China. In both
studies the same special treatment of directory authorities compared to relays or
bridges was observed, as well as a small percentage of cases where ﬁltering that
should have occurred did not.
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To evaluate the assumption that clients with a global IPID are easy to ﬁnd in a
range of IP addresses that we desire to measure from, take China as an example. On
average, 10% of the IP addresses in China responded to our probes so that we could
observe their IPID, and of those 13% were global. So, roughly 1% of the IP address
space of China can be used as clients for measurements with our method, enabling
experiments with excellent geographic and topological diversity.

4.6

Conclusion

We have presented a method for detecting intentional packet drops (e.g., due to
censorship) between two almost arbitrary hosts on the Internet, assuming the client
has a globally incrementing IPID and the server has an open port. Our method can
determine which direction packets are being dropped in, and is resistant to noise due
to our use of an ARMA model for intervention analysis.
In a measurement study using our method featuring clients from multiple continents, we observed that, of all measured client connections to Tor directory servers
that were censored, 98% of those were from China, and only 0.63% of measured
client connections from China to Tor directory servers were not censored. This is
congruent with current understandings about global Internet censorship, leading us
to conclude that our method is eﬀective.
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Chapter 5
Large-scale Spatiotemporal
Characterization of Inconsistencies
in GFW
A nation-scale ﬁrewall, colloquially referred to as the “Great Firewall of China,”
implements many diﬀerent types of censorship and content ﬁltering to control China’s
Internet traﬃc. Past work has shown that the ﬁrewall occasionally fails. In other
words, sometimes clients in China are able to reach blacklisted servers outside of
China. This phenomenon has not yet been characterized because it is infeasible to
ﬁnd a large and geographically diverse set of clients in China from which to test
connectivity.
In this chapter, we overcome this challenge by using hybrid idle scan techniques
that are able to measure connectivity between a remote client and an arbitrary server,
neither of which are under the control of the researcher performing measurements.1
In addition to hybrid idle scans, we present and employ a novel side channel in
1 For

more details on the hybrid idle scan, refer to Chapter 4.
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the Linux kernel’s SYN backlog. We demonstrate both techniques by measuring
the reachability of the Tor network which is known to be blocked in China. Our
measurements reveal that 1) failures in the ﬁrewall occur throughout the entire
country without any conspicuous geographical patterns, 2) a network block in China
appears to have unﬁltered access to parts of the Tor network, and 3) the ﬁltering
seems to be mostly centralized at the level of Internet exchange points. Our work
also answers many other open questions about the Great Firewall’s architecture and
implementation.

5.1

Introduction

More than 600 million Internet users are located behind the world’s most sophisticated and pervasive censorship system: the Great Firewall of China (GFW) [76].
Brought to life in 2003, the GFW has a tight grip on several layers of the TCP/IP
model and is known to block or ﬁlter IP addresses [107], TCP ports [107], DNS requests [57, 90, 109], HTTP requests [23, 74, 24], circumvention tools, and even social
networking sites [113].
This pervasive censorship gives rise to numerous circumvention tools seeking to
evade the GFW by exploiting a number of opportunities [82]. Of particular interest
is the Tor anonymity network [28] whose arms race with the operators of the GFW
now counts several iterations. Once having had 30,000 users solely from China, the
Tor network now is largely inaccessible from within China’s borders as illustrated in
Figure 5.1.
The amount of users trying to connect to the Tor network indicates that there
is a strong need for practical and scalable circumvention tools. Censorship circumvention, however, builds on censorship analysis. A solid understanding of censorship
systems is necessary in order to design sound and sustainable circumvention systems.
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Figure 5.1: The approximate amount of directly connecting Tor users (as opposed
to connecting over bridges) for the ﬁrst months of 2014. While the number of users
varies, it rarely exceeds 3,000.

However, it is diﬃcult to analyze Internet censorship without controlling either the
censored source machine or its—typically uncensored—communication destination.
This problem is usually tackled by obtaining access to censored source machines,
ﬁnding open proxies, renting virtual systems, or by cooperating with volunteers inside the censoring country. In the absence of these possibilities, censorship analysis
has to resort to observing traﬃc on the server’s side and inferring what the client is
seeing.
Our work ﬁlls this gap by presenting and evaluating network measurement techniques which can be used to expose censorship while controlling neither the source
nor the destination machine. This puts our study in stark contrast to previous work
which had to rely on proxies or volunteers, both of which provide limited coverage
of the censor’s networks. By being mostly independent of source and destination
machines, we are able to shed light on entirely unexplored areas of the Internet. We
evaluate our techniques by applying them to the Tor anonymity network, thereby
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handing the Tor Project practical tools to measure the reachability of their network.
Such tools are needed because bridges2 are frequently blocked in China without the
bridge operators or the Tor Project noticing [56]. Our work makes it possible to
test the reachability of these bridges without having a vantage point in China. As
a result, the Tor Project is able to learn which subset of bridges is still reachable
and hence undiscovered by the GFW. This knowledge facilitates the optimization of
bridge distribution [101], e.g., bridges blocked in China are only given out to users
outside China.
Our techniques are currently limited to testing basic IP connectivity. Thus, we
can only detect censorship on lower layers of the network stack, i.e., before a TCP
connection is even established. This kind of low-level censorship is very important to
the censors, however. For example, while social media controls on domestic sites in
China, such as Weibo, can be very sophisticated, users would simply use alternatives
such as Facebook if the low-level IP address blocking were not in place to prevent
this. Also, deep packet inspection (DPI) does not scale as well in terms of raw traﬃc
as does lower-level ﬁltering. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our techniques are
not applicable if censors only make use of DPI to block Tor as it was or is done by
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, and Syria [1].
We are interested not only in ﬁnding patterns in the GFW’s failures, but also
in gaining a better understanding of how the GFW is architected within China’s
backbone and provincial networks and whether previously observed details of its implementation are observed throughout the country. To this end, we focus our eﬀorts
on testing the following hypotheses that will illuminate the GFW’s architecture and
implementation. All hypotheses are with respect to the ﬁltering of TCP/IP packets
based on IP addresses and port numbers.
Hypothesis 1 In general, from any client to any destination if a SYN packet is
2 Bridges

are “hidden” Tor relays which are not listed in the public network consensus.
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ﬁltered by the GFW then a RST with the same source, destination, and port numbers
will also be ﬁltered. For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as “RSTs are treated the
same as SYNs.”

Hypothesis 2 There are no conspicuous geographic patterns in the GFW’s failures.
In other words, failures can occur in any part of the country. For brevity, we refer
to this hypothesis as “No geographic patterns in failures.”

Hypothesis 3 In general, the GFW blocks Tor relays by dropping SYN/ACK segments with IP address and port information that matches known Tor relays. Other
types of ﬁltering seen for Tor relays in China ( e.g., dropping SYN segments) are
a negligible fraction of the censorship. For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as
“server-to-client blocking.”

Hypothesis 4 At least some of the failures of the GFW are persistent, meaning
that the client and server are able to communicate throughout the day. Note that this
could also be due to intentionally whitelisted destinations, but in this chapter we refer
to all cases where clients in China can access Tor relays as “failures.” For brevity,
we refer to this hypothesis as “some failures are persistent.”

Hypothesis 5 At least some of the failures of the GFW exhibit diurnal patterns,
where a client and blacklisted server can communicate at some times of the day but
not others. For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as “some failures have diurnal
patterns.”

Hypothesis 6 In general, packets that are subject to censorship traverse at least one
or two hops, and sometimes more, into China before they are dropped by the GFW.
For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as “blocking is in the backbone.”
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By testing the above hypotheses, we further increase the public’s knowledge about
the GFW and by presenting and evaluating our measurement techniques, we equip
circumvention system developers with a set of tools to analyze and debug censorship
incidents. In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We describe the ﬁrst real-world application of the hybrid idle scan [33, 32],
explained in more details in Chapter 4, to a large-scale Internet measurement
problem, in which we measure the connectivity between the Tor anonymity
network and clients in China over a period of four weeks.
• We present and evaluate a novel side channel based on the Linux kernel’s SYN
backlog which enables indirect detection of packet loss.
• We increase the community’s understanding of how the GFW is architected
and how its blocking of the Tor network looks from diﬀerent clients all over
China.
In the rest of this chapter, we discuss some background of the GFW in Section 5.2
and our measurement techniques in Section 5.3, which is then followed by our experimental methodology in Section 5.4. We analyze the data we gathered and present
results in Section 5.5 and proceed with a discussion of our results in Section 5.6. The
chapter is concluded in Section 5.7. Related work is covered in Chapter 6

5.2

Motivation and GFW Background

The hypotheses enumerated in Section 5.1 were chosen because we wanted to address
the following open questions about the GFW:
• Are there geographic or other spatial patterns in the GFW’s failures? This
is important because such patterns could be exploited by evasion technologies
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if the patterns exist, but if no such patterns exist then evasion eﬀorts should
focus on other aspects of the GFW.
• Are there temporal patterns in the GFW’s failures? There are many diﬀerent
evasion eﬀorts that periodically test their methods to see if they have been
detected and blocked by the GFW. A solid understanding of temporal patterns
(such as diurnal patterns) will help these projects to better understand the
results of their tests.
• What kinds of packets are ﬁltered in diﬀerent parts of the country? This is
important, because if an evasion technology is tested in, e.g., Beijing but then
fails to work in another part of the country, the developers of the evasion
technology need to understand why.
• Where in China’s Internet backbone does the ﬁltering occur, and what is the
role of routing? If an evasion technology is being tested from two diﬀerent
sources in China or two diﬀerent destinations outside the country, the developers of the evasion technology may observe two diﬀerent results for their tests
and they need a good understanding of why this occurs.

Now we give more details about what was known before the work presented in
this chapter. A more comprehensive overview of previous work is given in Chapter 6.

5.2.1

Spatial Patterns

In Chapter 4, we found that a small percentage of tests showed no signs of censorship.
Our tests were taken between clients in China paired with Tor relays outside China.3
However, our experimental methodology was designed to test if the failures in the
3 Our

work is published at [33, 32]
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censorship observed by Winter and Lindskog [107] were also observed outside of Beijing or not. We made no attempt to choose clients or servers so that spatial patterns
could be identiﬁed. In this chapter, our experiments were speciﬁcally designed to
identify spatial and geographic patterns in the GFW’s failures.

5.2.2

Temporal Patterns

Neither our previous work nor Winter and Lindskog attempted to characterize temporal patterns in the GFW’s failures. This kind of characterization is diﬃcult because,
for a general understanding of temporal patterns, spatial patterns must be fully
understood. Otherwise temporal patterns may be speciﬁc to one location. Also,
temporal patterns are diﬃcult to extract from idle scan measurements because of
noise. This is why, in our experiments, we used traceroutes from a Tor relay to
analyze temporal patterns.

5.2.3

Details of the Filtering

What kinds of packets are ﬁltered? This is a key question, especially for evasion
technologies that seek to evade the GFW via insertion and evasion in the IP and
TCP layers. Winter and Lindskog described detailed results about what happens
to SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK, and RST packets, but their results were speciﬁc to one
location in China: Beijing. Also, any of their experiments that required observation
on the server were only able to be carried out between Beijing and one Tor relay
in Sweden. Our previous work in Chapter 4 had more spatial diversity in their
experiments, but because of the nature of the hybrid idle scan the only packets that
can be tested are SYN/ACKs from server to client and RSTs from client to server.
SYN packets or any kind of stateful connection cannot be tested with the hybrid idle
scan. All of these limitations in previous approaches is why our experiments include
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another—previously unknown—idle scan that uses the SYN backlog to make more
general inferences with a wider spatial variety.

5.2.4

Architecture of the GFW

There are generally regarded to be three theories about how the GFW is architected,
posited in technical papers [24, 110, 23, 11] or other media [36, 100]. One theory
posits that the ﬁltering occurs at choke points where oversea cables carrying international Internet traﬃc enter the country. Another theory is that the majority of
the ﬁltering occurs in three big Internet exchange points in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou [106], near where international traﬃc enters the country but positioned
more at central points in China’s backbone network. A third theory that has been
discussed is the possibility that the ﬁltering occurs—or may increasingly occur as
the GFW evolves—at the provincial level [110].
Our results about where the ﬁltering of SYN/ACKs from Tor relays occurs are
largely congruent with Xu et al.’s results about where RST injection based on deep
packet inspection occurs. In their results, CNCGROUP performed most of its RST
injection in the backbone, while CHINANET performed this type of censorship at the
provincial level. Since their study, CNCGROUP has bought CHINANET, but the
censorship at both the backbone and provincial levels, in about the same proportions
as reported by Xu et al., is also apparent in our results. This means that the routers
that perform port mirroring for deep packet inspection are probably the same routers
that enforce access controls such as blocking Tor by source IP address and TCP port.
It also means that where the ﬁltering occurs has not changed signiﬁcantly since the
study performed by Xu et al..
In addition to providing more information about where the ﬁltering occurs, our
work presented in this chapter raises interesting questions about how the GFW is
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architected, both in terms of implementations at routers and in terms of the big
picture. Winter and Lindskog observed that for Tor relays only the SYN/ACK from
the server is blocked, not the SYN from the client to the server. One of our key
results in this chapter is that this observation also applies to China in general for a
lot of diﬀerent geographic locations. This raises a question: why block SYN/ACKs
in the one direction, but not SYNs in the other?
One possible theory might be that the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) plays
a key role in the censorship by causing all international traﬃc to ﬂow through the
routers that implement the censorship. Because the GFW operators are presumably
restricted to announcing BGP routes for autonomous systems (ASes) that are in
China, they can only control routing in the direction of traﬃc that is entering China.
Hence SYN/ACKs from Tor relays outside China to clients in China are blocked
almost all the time, while SYNs from clients in China to Tor relays outside China
are much less likely to be blocked.
Another theory is based on speculating about the way the GFW operators monitor traﬃc to decide what to block. In a description of the GFW written in Chinese by
“Xylon Pan” [111], it is speculated that this is done because the server in an HTTP
connection typically sends a lot more content to the client than the client sends to
the server. Thus Netﬂow aggregation in the server-to-client direction works better,
because there is more traﬃc to be sampled. One theory put forward by Xylon Pan
is that since the GFW’s operators think about network ﬂows in the server-to-client
direction, so they also write access controls (such as the blocking of Tor by IP address
and TCP port) for the server-to-client direction.
The reason why this one-way blocking property (where SYN/ACKs entering
China are much more likely to be blocked than SYNs leaving China) exists is left for
future work. The major contribution of our present work in this regard is to conﬁrm
that this property is a general property that is observed all over China, not just in
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the one or two locations where previous tests [107, 111] have been performed.

5.3

Networking Background

The research questions we seek to answer require high geographical diversity of clients
in China. Typically, such a study would only be possible if we could ﬁnd and control
vantage points in all of China’s provinces. Instead, we exploit side channels allowing
us to detect intentional packet dropping—without controlling the two aﬀected machines. In particular, we use hybrid idle scans (see Chapter 4 and Section 5.3.3) and
SYN backlog scans (see Section 5.3.1). The idea behind these side channels as well
as their prerequisites are discussed in this section.

5.3.1

Side Channels in Linux’s SYN Backlog

A performance optimization in the Linux kernel’s SYN backlog can be used to detect
intentional packet dropping. Half-open TCP connections of network applications
are queued in the kernel’s SYN backlog whose size defaults to 256. These halfopen connections then turn into fully established TCP connections once the server’s
SYN/ACK was acknowledged by the client. If a proper response is not received
for an entry in the SYN backlog, it will retransmit the SYN/ACK several times.
However, if the SYN/ACK and its respective retransmissions are never acknowledged by the client, the half-open connection is removed from the backlog. When
under heavy load or under attack, a server’s backlog might ﬁll faster than it can be
processed. This causes attempted TCP connections to not be fully handled while
pending TCP connections time out. The Linux kernel mitigates this problem by
pruning an application’s SYN backlog. If the backlog becomes more than half full,
the kernel begins to reduce the number of SYN/ACK retransmissions for all pending
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connections [2]. As a result, half-open connections will time out earlier which should
bring the SYN backlog back into uncritical state. We show that the Linux kernel’s
pruning mechanism—by design a shared resource—opens a side channel which can be
used to measure intentional packet drops targeting a server. This is possible without
controlling said server.
Our key insight is that we can remotely measure the approximate size of a server’s
SYN backlog by sending SYN segments and counting the number of corresponding
SYN/ACK retransmissions. Starting with version number 2.2, the Linux kernel
retransmits unacknowledged SYN/ACK segments ﬁve times [3]. As a result, we
expect to receive the full number of ﬁve retransmissions when querying a service
whose SYN backlog is less than half full. If, on the other hand, the backlog becomes
more than half full, we will observe less than ﬁve retransmissions. When applied to
the problem of intentional packet dropping, this allows us to infer whether a ﬁrewall
blocks TCP connections by dropping the client’s SYN or the server’s SYN/ACK
segment.
It is worth mentioning that a server’s backlog state can also be inferred by coercing
it into using SYN cookies [34]. A server using SYN cookies reveals that its SYN
backlog is completely full. However, this measurement technique is eﬀectively a
SYN ﬂood and TCP connections which were established using SYN cookies suﬀer
from reduced throughput due to the lack of ﬂow control window scaling. In contrast
to triggering SYN cookies, our technique has no negative impact on servers or other
clients’ connections, when applied carefully.

5.3.2

The Global IP Identiﬁer

As described in Section 4.1, IP identiﬁers (IPIDs) are unique numbers assigned to
IP packets in case they are fragmented along a path. The receiving party is able
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to reassemble the fragmented packets by looking at their IPID ﬁeld. Most modern
TCP/IP stacks increment the IPID ﬁeld per connection or randomize it, as opposed
to globally incrementing it. A machine with a globally incrementing IPID keeps a
global counter that is incremented by 1 for every packet the machine sends, regardless
of the destination IP address. Being a shared resource, the IPID can be used by a
measurement machine talking to a remote machine to estimate how many packets
the remote machine has sent to other machines. Throughout this chapter, we refer to
machines with globally incrementing IPIDs as simply machines with “global IPIDs.”

5.3.3

Hybrid Idle Scan

In Chapter 4, we described our method for remotely detecting intentional packet
drops on the Internet via side channel inferences. This technique can discover packet
drops (e.g., caused by censorship) between two remote machines, as well as infer
in which direction the packet drops are occurring. The only major requirements
for this approach are a client with a global IPID and a target server with an open
port. Access to the client or the server is not required. Conceptually, the hybrid idle
scan technique can turn approximately 1% of the total IPv4 address space [33] into
measurement machines that can be used as vantage points to measure IP addressbased censorship—without having root access on those machines. This is why we
employ the hybrid idle scan technique for our geographic study of how Tor is blocked
in China.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the hybrid idle scan implementation queries the IPID
of the client to create a time series. By sending SYN/ACKs from the measurement
machine and receiving RST responses, the IPID of the client can be recorded. The
time series is used to compare a base case (when no traﬃc is being generated other
than noise) to a period of time when the server is sending SYN/ACKs to the client
(because of our spoofed SYNs). By comparing two phases, one phase where no SYN
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packets are sent to the server and one phase where SYN packets are sent to the
server with the return IP address spoofed to appear to be from the client, the hybrid
idle scan technique can detect three diﬀerent cases (plus an error case), shown in
Figure 4.1, with respect to IP packets being dropped by the network in between the
client and the server:

1. Server-to-client-dropped: SYN/ACKs are dropped in transit from the
server to the client causing the client’s IPID to not increase at all (except
for noise). See Figure 4.2.
2. No-packets-dropped: If no intentional packet dropping is happening, the
client’s IPID will go up by exactly one. See Figure 4.3.
3. Client-to-server-dropped: The RST responses sent by the client to the
server are dropped in transit. In this case, the server will continue to retransmit
SYN/ACKs and the client’s IPID will get incremented by the total number of
(re)transmitted SYN/ACKs, which is typically three to six. See Figure 4.4.
4. Error: A measurement error happens if networking errors occur during the
experiment, the IPID is found to not be global throughout the experiment, a
model is ﬁt to the data but does not match any of the three non-error cases
above, the data is too noisy and intervention analysis fails because we are not
able to ﬁt a model to the data, and/or other errors.

Note that these cases are the same cases as used for Chapter 4.
Auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) models are used to distinguish these
cases. This overcomes autocorrelated noise in IPID values (e.g., due to packet loss,
packet delay, or other traﬃc that the client is receiving). More details about the
ARMA modeling are described in Section 4.4
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5.3.4

The Tor Network

The Tor network [28] is an overlay network which provides its users with anonymity
on the Internet.

Tor clients expose a local SOCKS interface which is used to

anonymize TCP streams such as web traﬃc. As of April 2014, the network consists of approximately 4,500 volunteer-run relays, nine directory authorities, and one
bridge authority. While the relays anonymize the network traﬃc of Tor clients, the
authorities’ task is to keep track of all relays and to vote on and publish the network
consensus which Tor clients need in order to bootstrap. It is trivial for censors to
download the hourly published network consensus and block all IP address/TCP port
pairs found in it. Other circumvention systems suﬀer from the same problem [71].
All authorities are hard-coded in the Tor source code and their IP addresses
remain static. As a result, they constitute attractive choke points for censors. In
fact, blocking the IP addresses of all nine directory authorities is suﬃcient to prevent
direct connections to the Tor network.4 Our study focuses on the reachability of the
authorities and relays, as it is known that the GFW is blocking them [107]. Our
focus is on gathering more details about this blocking and characterizing it with a
large-scale spatiotemporal study.

5.4

Experimental Methodology

In this section, we describe the challenges our experimental methodology was designed to address, the data sets we collected, how our measurements help us to test
the hypotheses enumerated in Section 5.1, and other issues.
4 Note

that the Tor Project designed and implemented so-called bridges to tackle this
very problem but the details are outside the scope of this work.
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5.4.1

Encountered Challenges

Over the course of running our experiments and analyzing our data, we faced a
number of challenges which we discuss here.
Churn in the Tor network: While the size of the Tor network does not vary
considerably over a short period of time, the network’s churn rate can render longitudinal studies diﬃcult. For example, the median size of Tor’s network consensus (i.e.,
the number of Tor relays in the network) in March 2014 was 5,286. In total, however,
March has seen 13,343 unique relays—many of which were online for only hours. To
minimize the chance of selecting unstable Tor relays for longitudinal studies, only
relays having earned the “Stable” ﬂag should be considered [96]. Furthermore, the
relay descriptor archives could be examined to calculate a relay’s reachability over
time [95]. We selected only Tor relays that had an uptime of at least ﬁve days, and
ﬁltered out all data points where a node appeared to have left the network. After
having run our experiments, we removed one Tor relay in Argentina from our data
because its Tor and web ports switched during our experiments.
Geolocation of routers: For geolocating routers, we used MaxMind’s GeoIP2
City database [65]. As of April 2014, this database lacks accurate geolocation information for backbone routers in China. While provincial routers can typically be
mapped to their province based on whois records, backbone routers are all mapped
to the same bogus location at latitude 35 and longitude 105 which resides in an
unpopulated area in central China. We also used MaxMind for geolocating clients,
for which it is fairly accurate. For the location of routers, we used a combination
of whois information and round-trip delays per hop. We discarded hops in our data
that have whois records from China but are actually in Hong Kong or Pasadena,
California (where ChinaNet has a Point of Presence).
Diurnal patterns: For most measurements in this chapter, we measured once
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per hour throughout the day. This avoids bias and distortion. For example, if we
measured one set of clients in the morning and one set at night, diﬀerences between
the two sets of clients may be due to diﬀerent traﬃc patterns at the diﬀerent times
of day and not a property of the diﬀerent set of clients. Thus we always randomize
the order of our experiments when possible and repeat all measurements every hour
for at least one full day.

5.4.2

Experimental Design and Setup

Over the course of our experiments, we made use of three sets of Linux-based measurement machines in the U.S., China, and Europe. These three sets of machines
correspond to the three main datasets that we collected.
Machines in the U.S.: The three machines used for our hybrid idle scans
(see Section 5.3.3 and for more details Chapter 4) and SYN backlog scans (see Section 5.3.1) were located at our university campus (UNM) at the University of New
Mexico. All machines had a direct link to a research network which is free from
packet ﬁltering and does not conduct egress ﬁltering to block spoofed return IP addresses. Furthermore, the UNM measurement machines have IP addresses that are
not bound to any interfaces in order to eliminate unsolicited network packets. For
example, a measurement machine’s kernel should never send a RST when it receives
a SYN/ACK. The data set collected using the hybrid idle scan from these machines
is a large-scale geographic pairing of many clients (in China and other countries)
with many Tor relays and web servers around the world (mostly outside China). It
complements the other data sets discussed below because it gives a complete crosssection of censorship between many clients and many servers. This data will be used
to test Hypotheses 2 (no geographical patterns in failures) and 4 (some failures are
persistent).
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VPS in China: We rented a virtual private system (VPS) in China. The
system was located in Beijing (AS 23028) and was used for our SYN backlog scans
discussed in Section 5.3.1. Our VPS provider employed a transparent and stateful
TCP proxy in front of our VPS which silently dropped unsolicited segments. We
carefully implemented our SYN backlog scans so they ﬁrst established state whenever
necessary to be unaﬀected by the TCP proxy. These SYN backlog scans provide a
dataset that speaks to our assumptions about how China blocks Tor. It complements
the hybrid idle scan data set because, although the measurements are from a single
client in China, it allows us see exactly how that client experiences the censorship.
This data will be used to test Hypotheses 1 (RSTs are treated the same as SYNs)
and 3 (server to client blocking).
Tor relay in Europe: We used a long-established Tor relay at Karlstad University in Sweden for our traceroute measurements discussed in Section 5.4.2. The
relay has been part of the Tor network for several months, and using our VPS we
manually veriﬁed it to be blocked in China. This data set shows blocking between
one Tor relay and many clients in China. It complements the hybrid idle scan data
set because access to the Tor relay allows us to collect more details about the blocking. This data will be used to test Hypotheses 4 (some failures are persistent), 5
(some failures have diurnal patterns), and 6 (blocking is in the backbone).
We now present our probing infrastructure as well as our measurement methodology used to investigate the theories posited in Section 5.3.

Hybrid Idle Scans
Recall that by using hybrid idle scans, we have more freedom in choosing clients
in diﬀerent regions to test their reachability to diﬀerent servers. Our goal is to
determine blocking of Tor relays (outside of China) from the perspective of a large
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and geographically diverse set of clients (within China).
We are interested in knowing whether there exist diﬀerent experiences of the censorship of Tor for diﬀerent users in diﬀerent regions. Past work showed that a small
fraction of all Tor relays was accessible from a single vantage point in Beijing [107],
but what about the rest of the country? Key questions are: how does the GFW’s
architecture and China’s routing aﬀect censorship in diﬀerent regions?
IP address selection: We selected clients in China (CN), North America (NA),
and Europe (EU). In order to be able to select random IP addresses in China without favoring speciﬁc locations—especially large cities featuring a vast number of
allocated IP addresses—we divided the map of China into 33 ∗ 65 cells corresponding
to one degree of latitude and longitude. We ﬁlled this grid with all IP addresses
in MaxMind’s database that were documented to be in China. Then, we collected
IP addresses by randomly selecting a cell from our grid after checking that they
employed global IPIDs. In an analogous manner, clients from the EU and NA were
chosen by horizontally scanning these regions. After 24 hours, we gathered a pool
of IP addresses that belonged to machines with a global IPID. Then, we continually
checked the selected IP addresses for a 24-hour period to discard IP addresses that
changed global IPID behavior, went down, or were too noisy. At the end we had 11
NA, 7 EU, and 161 CN clients to use for our measurements.
Servers were chosen from three groups: Tor relays, Tor directory authorities, and
web servers. Tor relays were downloaded from a Tor relay status list [99]. We only
selected relays with an uptime greater than ﬁve days. In order to select Tor relays in
geographically diverse regions, we selected 10 Tor relays from Europe, 13 from the
United States, 20 from Russia, and 101 from other countries. This way, our selected
Tor relays were not biased toward Europe or the U.S., which exhibit more relays per
capita than other regions. The 10 Tor authorities were obtained from the Tor source
code. Web servers were chosen randomly from Alexa’s top 50 websites in China [8].
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Figure 5.2: The geographic distribution of all tested Tor relays (shown as onions)
and of our global IPID clients in China (shown as red marks). Note that outside
of Xinjiang the west of China has very little Internet penetration, which is why we
have few data points in this region and the distribution is biased towards the eastern
c 2014 Google, INEGI)
parts of China. (Map data �

All web server and Tor relay IP addresses were checked hourly to make sure that
they stayed up for at least 24 hours before being selected for our measurement.
The geographic distribution of our Tor relays as well as all clients in China is
illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Creating a complete bipartite graph: We used three machines at UNM
(our university campus) to run the hybrid idle scan experiments. We started the
experiments with 180 clients and 176 servers. Each day 20 clients and approximately
20 servers were selected for each of the machines. For 22 hours5 , every hour, we
performed the hybrid idle scan for each possible pair of client and server. Every
“scan round” performs: 1) two minutes of hybrid idle scans, 2) 30 seconds of sending
RSTs to clear the server’s backlog, and 3) ﬁve seconds of testing the client to assure
5 Two

hours per day were reserved for server data synchronization.
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that they remained online and kept their global IPID. Similar checks are performed
to ensure that servers remain online throughout each experiment. At any given time,
each IP address (client or server) was involved in only one test. After 27 days, each
client’s reachability was tested to all servers, i.e, our clients and servers created a
bipartite graph. For more details about the experiment design refer to Chapter 4.
Pruning the data: We used the selected IP addresses throughout our experiments. Naturally, some of the hosts went down or were occasionally too noisy. Also,
the host behind an IP address can change, e.g., a client with a global IPID might
lose its DHCP lease and get replaced with a client running a random IPID. To account for these issues, we perform tests throughout our experiments which cull out
data points where basic assumptions are not met. For every server involved in the
experiment, we had two checks: liveliness and the stable Tor ﬂag test. After each
scan, for ﬁve seconds we sent ﬁve SYN segments per second using UNM’s unbound
IP address. The data point passed the liveliness test only if it retransmits three or
more SYN/ACKs. Also, if the server was a Tor relay, we veriﬁed that the relay was
assigned the “Stable” ﬂag (cf. Section 5.4.1).
For every client, for ﬁve seconds, we sent ﬁve SYN/ACKs per second using UNM’s
unbound IP address. We expect the client to respond with RST segments totaling
in number to more than half the number of sent SYN/ACKs. If this is the case then
the data point passes the client’s liveliness test. The results of a scan were allowed
into the data set only if both the client and server passed their checks. Note that
each data point is one client and one server tested one time in a given hour. There
was a several-hour network outage that caused a hole in a portion of one day of our
data.
After culling out data that did not meet our basic assumptions, we were left with
36% of the total data collected. This 36% is the data described in Section 5.5 and
used for our analysis.
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Backlog Scans
After having presented the underlying side channel in Section 5.3.1, we now discuss
the implementation of our two backlog scan types which can answer two questions, 1)
“Do SYN segments from China reach a Tor relay?” and 2) “Do RST segments from
China reach a Tor relay?”. Basically, we answer both questions by ﬁrst transmitting
crafted TCP segments to a relay, thus manipulating its SYN backlog, and then
querying its backlog size by counting the relay’s SYN/ACK retransmissions. The
conceptual implementation of both scan types is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Backlog SYN scan
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(b) RST scan to infer whether
RST segments from VPS reach
Tor. “MM” is our measurement
machine.

Figure 5.3: The two types of backlog scans we employ. The purpose of these scans is
to verify if 1) SYN segments from China reach a Tor relay and if 2) RST segments
from China reach a Tor relay.

SYN scan: The SYN scan—depicted in Figure 5.3(a)—is started by MM by
sending ﬁve SYN segments to Tor in order to infer the relay’s backlog size when
under stress.6 After a delay of approximately 500 ms, VPS proceeds by sending
145 SYN segments whose purpose is to ﬁll the relay’s backlog by more than half.
6 We

transmit ﬁve SYN segments rather than just one to account for packet loss.
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Recall that the backlog size defaults to 256, so we only ﬁll the backlog to 59%. That
way, we can make the Tor relay’s kernel prune MM’s SYN segments, thus reducing
their retransmissions. Finally, MM knows that VPS’s SYNs reached the relay if the
number of SYN/ACK retransmissions for its ﬁve SYNs is lower than ﬁve. Otherwise,
VPS’s SYNs did not reach the relay. This type of inference is necessary because, most
of the time, China’s GFW drops SYN/ACKs from known Tor relays.
RST scan: Our RST scan incorporates an additional step but is based on the
same principle. As illustrated in Figure 5.3(b), MM starts by sending 10 SYN segments whose purpose is, analogous to the SYN scan, to monitor the relay’s backlog
size. Afterwards, MM proceeds by sending 145 spoofed SYN segments with VPS’s
source address. Note that we cannot send the SYN segments from VPS as they might
be blocked. By sending spoofed SYN segments from an unﬁltered network link, we
can ensure that the segments reach the Tor relay. Upon receiving the SYN segment
burst, the relay replies with SYN/ACK segments which we expect to be dropped by
the GFW. In the ﬁnal step, VPS sends a burst of RST segments to the Tor relay.
The RST segments are crafted so that every RST segment corresponds to one of
the relay’s SYN/ACK segments. The purpose of the RST burst is to terminate all
half-open connections, thus clearing the relay’s backlog. Based on how many retransmissions we observe for the 10 “probing SYNs”, we can infer whether the RST
segments were dropped by the GFW or not. Receiving ﬁve retransmissions means
that the backlog was not cleared and the RST segments were dropped. Receiving
less than ﬁve retransmissions means that the backlog was successfully cleared and
the RST segments were not dropped by the GFW. This kind of inference is necessary because machines outside China cannot measure directly what happens to RST
packets sent from China, and machines inside China are very limited in their ability
to infer what is happening on blocked IP address/TCP port pairs.
Implementation: We implemented our scans using a collection of bash scripts
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and a patched version of the tool hping3 [87]. Accurate timing was crucial for our
experiments. To keep the clock of our machines synchronized, we used the tool ntp
which implements the network time protocol. Recall that the SYN backlog behavior
we are exploiting is limited to Linux kernels (cf. Section 5.3.1). As a result, our
scans targeted the subset of 94 out of our 144 Tor relays which are known to run
Linux. Tor relays periodically publish their server descriptors—which includes their
operating system—to all directory authorities so there is no need for us to guess the
operating system of Tor relays.
Pruning the data: By pruning the backlog scan data, we aim to make sure that
the relay runs an unmodiﬁed Linux TCP/IP stack. After scanning a relay, we send
three “baseline SYNs” to it in order to query its original amount of SYN/ACK retransmissions. First, we discard scans in which the relay never sent ﬁve SYN/ACK
retransmissions, Linux’s default value since version 2.2. For example, we found
embedded Linux relays which always retransmit SYN/ACK segments four times,
regardless of their backlog size. Second, we also discard scans whose SYN/ACK retransmissions do not exhibit Linux’s exponential backoﬀ behavior. Third and ﬁnally,
we discard scans where the relay was oﬄine or other networking problems occurred.
These three pruning steps discarded 774 out of all 2,094 scans (37%).

Traceroutes into China
We want to learn if there are unﬁltered routes leading into China. To investigate this
question, we used our Tor relay in Europe to run traceroutes to numerous destinations
in China. After a country-wide scan, we obtained a list of 3,934 IP addresses in China
that responded to SYN/ACKs and were distributed geographically in a diverse way,
which served as our traceroute destinations. For every IP address, we ran two TCP
traceroutes; one whose TCP source port was equal to the ﬁltered Tor port 9001
and one whose TCP port was set to the unused and unﬁltered port 9002. The
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traceroutes had both their SYN and ACK bit set. We used a slightly modiﬁed
version of the tool hping3 [87] to run the traceroutes as it allowed us to send TCP
segments with a source port which is bound by the Tor process.7 Starting on 4 May
2014, we ran the traceroutes on an hourly basis for two days, resulting in a total of
3, 934 · 24 · 2 · 2 = 377, 664 traceroutes. We determined where the traceroutes entered
China using whois and round-trip time information. We culled out a small amount
of data that did not enter China through a known backbone network, since all such
data either appeared to enter China in Pasadena, California (a case we can handle
but will require deeper analysis into whois records) or was destined for clients that
we determined to actually be in Hong Kong.

5.4.3

Good Internet Citizenship

We took several steps to devise our scans to be minimally invasive. First, we set
up a web server on our measurement machines whose index page informed visitors
about our experiments. The page contained our contact information to provide
alarmed network operators with an opportunity to contact us and opt out of our
measurements. Furthermore, we carefully designed our measurements so that it is
very unlikely that they harmed any computers or networks. Throughout the lifetime
of our experiments, we did not receive any complaints. We discuss ethical aspects of
our measurements in Section 5.6.3, and also in more details in Chapter 7.

5.5

Analysis and Results

We now analyze the three data sets we gathered; the hybrid idle scans, the backlog
scans, as well as the traceroutes into China.
7 We

modiﬁed the tool to constantly increase the TTL of outgoing TCP segments. The
default behavior is to wait for every hop to reply with a “TTL exceeded” ICMP message.
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5.5.1

Hybrid Idle Scans

The hybrid idle scan data was collected from 15 March 2014 to 10 April 2014. One
client was removed from the data because we determined that it was in Hong Kong
and as a result not subject to the GFW’s ﬁltering.
Table 5.1 shows the results of our hybrid idle scans. The column S → C is
short for Server-to-client-dropped, None means No-packets-dropped, C → S
means Client-to-server-dropped, and Error simply means Error. In the table’s
rows, CN is short for China, EU means Europe, and NA means North America.
As for the server types, Tor−Dir is a Tor directory authority, Tor−Relay is a Tor
relay, and Web is a web server. Our results conﬁrm that, in general, SYN/ACKs
entering China from blacklisted IP address/TCP port pairs are blocked. Some web
servers were censored, and some Tor nodes were censored outside China. This is
to be expected because even in countries that do not perform nation-scale Internet
censorship, organizations frequently take steps to ﬁlter material such as pornography
or ﬁle sharing sites. Note that highly popular websites often contain material that
is subject to censorship.
The most interesting result from the hybrid idle scans is that the No-packetsdropped case was measured all over the country without any noticeable geographic
pattern. The geographic distribution of observed No-packets-dropped cases is
shown in Figure 5.4. The case distribution closely matches the distribution of our
clients which, in turn, matches the geographic Internet penetration patterns of China.
This means that the failures in China’s IP address/TCP port blacklisting mechanisms
are not limited to one region or one network block. We provide a more thorough
analysis in Section 5.5.2, which conﬁrms Hypothesis 2.
We also observed that in many cases these ﬁltering failures are persistent and last
throughout the day. We witnessed four client/server pairs where all 22 measurements
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Figure 5.4: The color temperature for clients corresponds to the number of observed
No-packets-dropped cases over the entire experiment. No geographic or topological pattern is visible. Instead, the distribution matches the geographic Internet
c 2014 Basarsoft, Google, ORION-ME,
penetration patterns of China. (Map data �
SK planet, ZENRIN)

in a day returned No-packets-dropped. We redacted the clients’ 16 least signiﬁcant
bits:
Client 58.193.0.0 (CN) → server 198.96.155.3 (CA)
Client 58.193.0.0 (CN) → server 161.53.116.37 (HR)
Client 58.193.0.0 (CN) → server 128.173.89.245 (US)
Client 121.194.0.0 (CN) → server 198.96.155.3 (CA)

This would give evidence towards Hypothesis 4, but our traceroute results reveal that CERNET does not perform the type of blocking we are measuring at
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all so later in this section we will discuss similar failures in commercial networks.
Clients 58.193.0.0 and 121.194.0.0 are part of the Chinese Educational and Research
Network (CERNET). Server 198.96.155.3 is a long-established Tor exit relay at the
University of Waterloo. 161.53.116.37 and 128.173.89.245 are Tor relays in Croatia and the U.S., respectively. There were also many instances where client/server
pairs showed Server-to-client-dropped for most of the day but also showed Nopackets-dropped once or a handful of times.
Table 5.1: Results from the hybrid idle scan measurement study.
Client Server
CN Tor−Relay
CN Tor−Dir
CN
Web
EU Tor−Relay
EU Tor−Dir
EU
Web
NA Tor−Relay
NA Tor−Dir
NA
Web

5.5.2

S → C (%)
116,460 (81.52)
8,922 (64.91)
306 (1.23)
18 (0.20)
2 (0.25)
19 (1.23)
45 (0.39)
4 (0.37)
32 (1.52)

None (%)
555 (0.39)
31 (0.23)
15,663 (62.95)
8,589 (96.79)
776 (96.76)
1,333 (86.28)
11,022 (94.48)
1,025 (94.73)
1,794 (85.06)

C → S (%)
786 (0.55)
2,696 (19.61)
2,688 (10.80)
22 (0.25)
0 (0.00)
95 (6.15)
33 (0.28)
3 (0.28)
98 (4.65)

Error (%)
25,061 (17.54)
2,097 (15.25)
6,226 (25.02)
245 (2.76)
24 (2.99)
98 (6.34)
566 (4.85)
50 (4.62)
185 (8.77)

Temporal and Spatial Association

We now seek to answer the question of whether there are any temporal or spatial
associations among the No-packets-dropped cases observed for Tor relays tested
from within China.
Temporal association is shown in Figure 5.5. The probabilities are computed by a
simple counting technique. We have the hourly count of the number of No-packetsdropped cases for each source. For each occurrence of No-packets-dropped, we
check if there are other No-packets-dropped cases in the subsequent hours. We use
151 sources for this calculation, excluding the educational sources, which contained
353 No-packets-dropped cases in total. The ﬁnal probabilities are averaged over all
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Figure 5.5: The temporal association between cases of No-packets-dropped. The
x axis shows the amount of hours since the last No-packets-dropped case whereas
the y axis shows the probability of observing another case of No-packets-dropped.

sources. With the increase in the lag amount in the x-axis, the probability decreases.
This shows that No-packets-dropped cases generally happen in bursts of hours.
Spatial association is shown in Figure 5.6. We use the latitude and longitude of
the sources as two-dimensional coordinates. The curvature of the earth is ignored
while computing the distance between sources. For every source, we ﬁnd the geographically K-nearest neighboring sources and average their count. We compute the
Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient between the count of No-packets-dropped cases
for a source and the average of the same for the neighboring sources. Note that
Pearson’s correlation has a range of −1.0 to 1.0. Our maximum observed correlation
value of 0.26 is, therefore, a very weak positive correlation and supports the fact that
there is no signiﬁcant geographical association between sources and their neighbors.
With the increase of the neighborhood radius, the correlation decreases to below
0.1. Together with the fact that the cases of No-packets-dropped are distributed
fairly evenly in all geographic regions (see Figure 5.4), this is strong support for
Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 5.6: Spatial association between clients in China. The x axis shows the
neighborhood radius (k) and the y axis shows the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient.

5.5.3

SYN Backlog Scans

We began our backlog scans on 24 March 2014 and ran them twice a day with
approximately 12 hours in between the scans until 10 April 2014. We gathered a
total of 2,094 scans and after pruning, this eﬀort yielded 1,320 scans (63%).

Reachable Tor Relays
Out of all 1,320 backlog scans, 33 scans (2.5%) to 12 unique IP addresses contained the respective Tor relay’s SYN/ACK segments, indicating that no ﬁltering
was happening. Interestingly, 19 of these 33 scans targeted the directory authority 128.31.0.39 on port 9131. Only the RST scan and not the SYN scan yielded
SYN/ACKs from the directory authority.
The results in Table 5.2 show that, in general, if a RST packet passes through
the GFW then a SYN packet also will. This conﬁrms one of the basic assumptions
behind the hybrid idle scan, and conﬁrms Hypothesis 1. Also, the fact that most
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Table 5.2: Backlog scan results.
SYN passes
SYN dropped

RST passes
666 (80%)
68 (8.2%)

RST dropped
39 (4.7%)
53 (6.4%)

Table 5.3: The results of our traceroute measurements.
EDU Rand EDU Tor COM Rand COM Tor
Stalled
1,061
1,045
111,133
163,095
Finished
428
433
53,479
429
SYNs were allowed to pass through the GFW conﬁrms Hypothesis 3.

5.5.4

Traceroutes

Table 5.3 shows the results of our traceroute measurements. In the table, “EDU”
indicates that the ﬁrst hop in China in the traceroute is the educational and research
network backbone, CERNET (210.250.0.0/16 or 101.4.112.0/24) or another scientiﬁc
network called CSTNET (159.226.0.0/16). “COM” indicates that the ﬁrst hop in
China was a commercial backbone, one of: CNCGROUP (219.158.0.0/16), China
Telecom/CHINANET (202.97.0.0/16), China Mobile Communications Corporation
(211.136.1.0/24 or 221.176.23.0/24), or the China Telecom Next Carrying Network
backbone (50.43.0.0/16). All other entry points were thrown out because they were
actually in Hong Kong or Pasadena, and that usually indicated that the destination
IP address was not in China or non-Chinese routing hops had not been properly
culled. “Tor” means that the source port of the SYN/ACKs sent in the traceroute
was the Tor port, and “rand” means that the source port was another port that
the GFW does not ﬁlter. Thus, “Tor” traceroutes should always stop before the
destination host if the ﬁltering is eﬀective on that route, and “rand” should reach
the destination unless there are other types of ﬁltering in play, such as ICMP ﬁltering
or ﬁrewalls not related to censorship. The elements in the table are the number of
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Figure 5.7: The amount of hops (log scale) in China, our ﬁltered traceroutes could
traverse. For example, a hop count of ﬁve means that a traceroute could successfully
reach the ﬁfth router inside China.

times that a traceroute reached all the way to the destination.
Surprisingly, the educational and research networks, in particular CERNET, do
not seem to be implementing this type of ﬁltering at all. The “Tor” and “rand”
columns are nearly identical for the “EDU” traceroutes. The “COM” traceroutes,
however, show that commercial networks are clearly censoring Tor by dropping
SYN/ACKs. The “rand” traceroutes reached their destination 53,479 times, while
the “Tor” traceroutes aimed at the same destinations only reached the destination
end host 429 times. Similar to the hybrid idle scan results, these failures were all
over the country and for any destination IP address where at least one failure was
observed, the number of failures ranged from 1 to 48 (i.e., all 48 hours of measurements). The number of failures in the most prominent destinations where the
traceroute entered China on a commercial background included one instance where
48 failures were observed and two where 47 were observed. This means that sometimes the failures are relatively persistent, conﬁrming Hypothesis 4.
Figure 5.7 shows the amount of hops into China, ﬁltered “Tor” port traceroutes
traversed before stalling. For each measurement of each hour of each day, we only
add the data to Figure 5.7 if the “rand” traceroute reached the destination and the
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Figure 5.8: The amount of unﬁltered traceroutes from our Tor relay to clients in
China over time. A diurnal pattern is visible.

“Tor” traceroute did not. In most cases, the ﬁltered packets make it two hops into
China, conﬁrming Hypothesis 6.
Figure 5.8 shows the number of failures for traceroutes that entered China on the
commercial network backbone, per hour. The diurnal patterns apparent in the ﬁgure
conﬁrm Hypothesis 5. Note that 02:00 UTC is 10:00 (or, 10:00 am) in Beijing.

5.6

Discussion

We discuss three diﬀerent aspects of our work in this section: what we learned about
the ﬁltering of Tor in China, what we learned about the architecture of the GFW,
and ethical considerations.

5.6.1

Filtering of Tor in China

Our results suggest that the ﬁltering of Tor in China has several interesting aspects,
some of which may even be useful for circumvention eﬀorts. We showed that the
failures in the ﬁltering occur in every part of the country, and they are sometimes
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Figure 5.9: The amount of directly connecting Tor users over the ﬁrst seven months
of 2013. The diagram shows several spikes and a “valley” in between March and
May.

intermittent and sometimes persistent. A historical example of intermittent failures
is illustrated in Figure 5.9. The diagram shows the amount of directly connecting
Tor users in China in the ﬁrst seven months of 2013. A relatively stable “valley” in
between March an May is clearly visible. This valley is surrounded by signiﬁcantly
higher usage numbers.
We also showed that this type of ﬁltering does not occur on CERNET, the educational and research backbone of China’s Internet. This might suggest that CERNET
users can reach the Tor network, or it might suggest that CERNET employs a more
sophisticated method for detecting and interfering with connections to the Tor network, perhaps something stateful and based on deep packet inspection.
Our results raise additional questions such as “is it possible to run a Tor relay
in China?”. In general, the Tor network represents a complete graph. As a result,
every relay should be able to connect (and generally maintain connections) to all
other relays in the network. Furthermore, relays must be able to connect to the
directory authorities in order to upload their server descriptors. If CERNET is
indeed whitelisted, a Tor relay inside CERNET might be able to successfully join
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the Tor network. In addition, previous research suggested that domestic Tor traﬃc
in China is not subject to blocking [107]. If ﬁltering indeed happens at the Internet
exchange point (IXP) level, as suggested by our data, it is not surprising that the
GFW is generally unable to ﬁlter domestic network traﬃc as it typically does not
reach IXP level8 and is of signiﬁcantly higher volume than international traﬃc. As
a result, functioning Tor relays or bridges inside CERNET might be able to connect
users in China to the rest of the Tor network.

5.6.2

The Architecture of the GFW

Our results also shed light on the architecture of the GFW, at least with respect to the
mechanism that blacklists IP address/TCP port pairs. As discussed in Section 5.3,
the three theories about how the GFW is architected are that 1) the ﬁltering occurs
at choke points where undersea cables enter the country, 2) the ﬁltering occurs in
the backbone in large IXPs, and 3) the ﬁltering occurs at a regional level. While our
results show some ﬁltering occurring many hops into China and some ﬁltering occurring before packets can even enter China, the majority of the ﬁltering happens about
two hops into China (presumably at the large IXP in Beijing). Thus, Hypothesis 6 is
most consistent with the theory that the ﬁltering occurs in the backbone. Note that
this observation is in accordance with other recent research eﬀorts which focused on
the GFW’s DNS injection [11]. The small amount of routes that are ﬁltered at the
provincial level, which were also observed by Xu et al. [110], can be explained by the
strategy employed by China’s formerly second-largest ISP, CNCGROUP, which was
recently bought by the largest (CHINANET).
While whitelisting would appear as persistent failures in the ﬁltering and the
ﬁltering apparatus getting overloaded with traﬃc would appear as intermittent fail8 We

ignore routing phenomena such as “boomerang routing”.
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ures, the mix of intermittent failures and diurnal patterns with persistent failures
suggests that routing is a major reason why the ﬁltering fails. Hypotheses 4 and 5
are most consistent with the theory that the ﬁltering occurs in the backbone, because
provincial networks in China are very hierarchical [97] and undersea cables are few
in number [6]. Hypothesis 2 is also most consistent with backbone-level ﬁltering for
this reason.

5.6.3

Ethical Considerations

Our work has two ethical considerations that need to be discussed. First, our SYN
backlog scans brieﬂy ﬁll a Tor relay’s backlog in order to be able to observe packet
drops. In general, the rate at which we are sending SYN packets, without intention
of completing a connection, is not enough to create a denial-of-service condition on
any modern network stack.
Second, our idle scans create unsolicited traﬃc between a client and a server. This
traﬃc—which can be observed by the censor—is only SYN/ACKs from the server to
the client and RSTs from the client to the server. As a result, we are not causing any
meaningful communication other than background noise as it is also caused by port
scanning activity. In terms of the traﬃc that the censor sees, the hybrid idle scan
technique is no diﬀerent from if Tor relay operators performed simple connectivity
measurements by directly sending SYN/ACKs.
For more detailed discussion on ethics, refer to Chapter 7.
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5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have characterized the mechanism that the Great Firewall of
China uses to block the Tor network using a hybrid idle scan that can measure
connectivity from the perspective of many clients all over China. We have also
presented a novel SYN backlog idle scan that can infer packets received by a server
without causing denial of service. These novel Internet measurement techniques
open up whole new possibilities in terms of being able to measure the Internet from
the perspective of arbitrary clients and servers. This is extremely important when
it comes to characterizing and documenting Internet censorship around the world,
because of the diﬃculty in ﬁnding volunteers geographically dispersed throughout a
country.
We also evaluated our techniques which led to several new insights about the inner
workings of the Great Firewall. Our data shows that 1) at least several machines
inside CERNET (China Education and Research Network) are able to connect to Tor
relays, 2) ﬁltering seems to be centralized at the IXP level, and 3) ﬁltering is quite
reliable with the Tor network being either almost completely reachable or almost
completely blocked in diﬀerent parts of the country.
Our code is available at: http://cs.unm.edu/~royaen/gfw/.
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Related Work
This chapter will give an overview of related work in idle and port scanning techniques
(see Section 6.1) and censorship measurement (see Section 6.2).

6.1

Idle and Port Scanning

Port scanning is an important ﬁrst step in most network attacks and in network
analysis [73]. There has been a fair amount of techniques focused on port scanning
a target host or a network. Port scans can be initiated from a single source and
can be detected by using techniques such as anomaly detection [51]. They can
also be distributed, meaning that the attacker uses multiple hosts to coordinate a
stealth scans [38, 39, 47]. Javed et al. proposed a general approach for detecting
distributed scans in which individual attack sources each operate in a stealthy, lowproﬁle manner. Bhuyan et al. [17] created a survey on port scans and their detection
methodologies.
In general, there have been many eﬀorts to detect port scans. Staniford et al. [93]
use simulated annealing to detect stealthy scans. Leckie and Kotagiri [54] present a
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probabilistic approach for detecting port scans, and Muelder et al. [70] proposes a
visualization approach. The scan behavior of Internet worms has been studied [88,
105, 42, 104], as has the scan detection problem at the backbone level [92, 91] and
measurements of port scans and their side eﬀects at Internet telescopes [72]. Jung et
al. [46] describe an approach based on sequential hypothesis testing to detect port
scans. To our knowledge, our techniques in Chapter 3 represent the ﬁrst study to
model idle scans that can be used for stealth scans but also for inferring IP-based
trust relationships. Passively identifying hosts that have no routable IP address
and are hidden by network address translation [14, 53] is a related problem to idle
scans, but assumes a very diﬀerent threat model where some amount of traﬃc can
be viewed passively by the attacker. As discussed earlier, Antirez [12] proposed the
ﬁrst type of idle scan which we call an IPID idle port scan. Based on Antirez’ work,
we proposed a RST, SYN backlog, and a hybrid idle scans which were all explained
in detail in previous chapters. The main beneﬁt of using our hybrid idle scan is
that it can be used to detect intentional packet dropping based on IP addresses
and it requires no commonalities between the measurement machine’s routes to the
server or client and the routes between the server and client. Similar to our work
is iPlane [59]. The iPlane project sends packets from PlanetLab nodes to carefully
chosen hosts, and then compounds loss on speciﬁc routes to estimate the packet loss
between arbitrary endpoints without access to those endpoints. This, however, does
not detect IP-address-speciﬁc packet drops.
There exist other advanced methods for inferring information about remote networks and hosts. Qian et al. [79] demonstrate that ﬁrewall behavior with respect
to sequence numbers can be used to infer sequence numbers and perform oﬀ-path
TCP/IP connection hijacking. Chen et al. [21] use the IPID ﬁeld to perform advanced inferences about the amount of internal traﬃc generated by a server, the
number of servers in a load-balanced setting, and one-way delays. Morbitzer [68]
explores idle scans in IPv6. Knockel et al. use a side-channel technique to infer
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whether two machines are exchanging packets on the Internet [52]. Queen [102] utilizes recursive DNS queries to measure the packet loss between a pair of DNS servers,
and extrapolates from this to estimate the packet loss rate between arbitrary hosts.
Reverse traceroutes can be performed by spooﬁng return IP addresses and using the
IP options for recording routes and timestamps [48]. De A. Rocha et al. [25] present
a method for estimating the average variance and delay based on spoofed return IP
addresses and the IPID ﬁeld. Qian et al. make use of the IPID ﬁeld to infer in which
direction port blocking is happening in the context of email spamming [80].

6.2

Censorship Measurement

I consider censorship to be one of the most important issues facing the Internet today.
Accordingly, there is a growing body of work in this area. With respect to deployed
platforms that have been used for censorship, Sfakianakis et al. [89] designed CensMon that is a web censorship monitor which is run on top of PlanetLab [77]. Filastò
and Appelbaum presented OONI [37] that can be used to measure traﬃc manipulation and content blocking. Herdict [45] and OpenNet [69] have been monitoring and
reporting on Internet ﬁltering and surveillance practices. The Chokepoint project [4]
is focused on the collection, analysis, and reporting of information related to Internet
blockages and network neutrality issues around the world. More recently, Anderson
et al. [10] proposed to use the RIPE Atlas network [60] to measure censorship. I
believe our work, idle scan inference techniques, is an eﬀective method for measuring
Internet censorship around the world. The most notable diﬀerence to previous work
is that our measurement techniques do not require control over either machine which
is part of the censored communication. While this enables large-scale distributed
studies, it comes at the cost of reduced ﬂexibility.
To the best of my knowledge, my work is the ﬁrst to employ idle scan infer-
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ence techniques for a large-scale Internet measurement study where the collected
data represents the “view” of geographically distributed clients. Platforms such as
DIMES [62], M-Lab [63], PlanetLab [61], and RIPE Atlas [60] have traditionally
been the only way to measure from the perspective of a large number of clients,
but they can be very limited, especially in non-Western regions of the Internet such
as China. My work overcomes a fundamental limitation of Internet measurement:
that measurements traditionally have only been possible from the perspective of the
measurement machines under the control of the researchers.
Next we focus on related work speciﬁc to the Great Firewall of China(GFW).
The GFW was ﬁrst described in an article in 2600 magazine [98]. In 2006, Clayton,
Murdoch, and Watson investigated the ﬁrewall’s keyword ﬁltering mechanism and
demonstrated that it can be circumvented by simply ignoring the ﬁrewall’s injected
RST segments [23]. Clayton et al.’s study was limited to how the ﬁltering works.
What it ﬁlters was covered by Crandall et al. in 2007 [24], along with more details
about routing. Using latent semantic analysis, the authors bootstrapped a set of
122 keywords which were used to probe the ﬁrewall over time. The study also
shows that ﬁltering is probably not happening at the border of China’s Internet.
Xu, Mao, and Halderman made an eﬀort to pinpoint where exactly the ﬁltering is h
happening [110]. The authors came to the conclusion that most ﬁltering is happening
in border ASes but some ﬁltering is also happening in provincial networks. Park and
Crandall revisited the GFW’s keyword ﬁltering mechanism and discussed why the
ﬁltering of HTML responses was discontinued in late 2008 [74].
In addition to topology and HTTP ﬁltering, another direction of research focused
on how the GFW operates on the TCP/IP layer. In 2006, Clayton et al. already
showed that the GFW is terminating suspicious HTTP requests using injected RST
segments. Weaver, Sommer, and Paxson showed that it is possible to not only
distinguish genuine from injected RST segments but also to ﬁngerprint networking
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devices injecting the segments [103]. More recently in 2013, Khattak et al. probed
the GFW in order to ﬁnd evasion opportunities on the TCP/IP layer [50]. Resorting
to techniques ﬁrst discussed by Ptacek and Newsham in 1998 [78], the authors showed
that there are numerous evasion opportunities when crafting TCP and IP packets.
In addition to the design and topology of the GFW, some work focused on how
the GFW blocks application protocols other than HTTP. In 2007, Lowe, Winters,
and Marcus showed that the GFW is also conducting DNS poisoning [57]. A more
comprehensive study was conducted by anonymous authors in 2012 [90]. The authors
sent DNS queries to several million IP addresses in China, thereby demonstrating
that the GFW’s DNS poisoning causes collateral damage, i.e., interferes with communication outside China. A similar DNS-related study, also by anonymous authors,
was done in 2014 [11]. The authors attempted to localize the DNS injectors’ location,
extracted the GFW’s DNS blacklist, and used side channel’s in the GFW’s design to
estimate its design. Most work discussed so far treated the ﬁrewall as a monolithic
entity. Wright showed in 2012 that there are regional variations in DNS poisoning,
thus suggesting that censorship should be investigated on a more ﬁne-grained level
with attention to geographical diversity in measurements [109]. In addition to DNS
and HTTP, the GFW is known to block the Tor anonymity network. Using a VPS
in China, Winter and Lindskog [107] investigated how the ﬁrewall’s active probing
infrastructure is used to dynamically block Tor bridges.

6.3

Summary

To summarize, my dissertation work is the ﬁrst work to enable measuring connectivity between two hosts on the Internet without having access to either of those hosts
or being in the path between them. Idle scans, and, in general, TCP/IP side channels, oﬀer many opportunities for Internet measurement. The aim of my dissertation
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work is to serve as a foundation for this nascent research area.
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Chapter 7
Ethical Considerations
This thesis proposes several experiments which involve sending unsolicited traﬃc to
computers on the Internet. In particular, we proposed two types of experiments
which require further discussion of potential ethical issues.
The ﬁrst experiment is the SYN backlog scan which is discussed in Section 5.4.2.
The backlog scan brieﬂy ﬁlls the SYN backlog of a Tor relay in order to be able to
determine if packets are dropped on their way to the relay. As long as the backlog
does not become completely full, no harm is done. If however, the backlog is ﬁlled
entirely, a computer would begin using SYN cookies [16] which reduces the throughput of TCP connections. To minimize the chance of harming a computer or network
while scanning it, we carefully crafted the parameters of our scans to make them as
uninvasive as possible. As a result, it is very unlikely that our experiments ever ﬁll
a computer’s SYN backlog.
The second experiment which should be discussed are our idle scans which create
unsolicited traﬃc between two computers. A passive adversary observing an idle scan
could believe that the two scanned machines are deliberately communicating with
each other. This could have negative consequences if a censor believes that a user is
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communicating with a sensitive or forbidden IP address. However, it is unlikely that
a censor would come to such a conclusion as the client-to-server traﬃc consists only of
RST segments and the server-to-client traﬃc only consists of SYN/ACK segments.
An adversary would not witness a full TCP handshake, let alone any actual data
transfer. As a result, we believe that it is unlikely that a censor would consider our
idle scans to be malicious. Nevertheless, we stress that these experiments should
only be carried out after assessing the political situation in the respective country
and verifying that something as simple as TCP connections are unlikely to lead to
political consequences.
Durumeric et al. [30] provide a more comprehensive ethics discussions of Internet
scans in general. The work in this thesis follows these best practices. The Menlo
report [29] proposes a framework for ethical guidelines for computer and information
security research based on the 1979 Belmont report [85]. Wright et al. [109] attempt
to start a discussion about the potentially signiﬁcant ethical and legal concerns which
are often faced in censorship measurement.
More related to networking research, Allman and Paxson [9] discuss issues around
sharing network measurement data. The authors suggest a set of guidelines which
should be followed when providing data as well as when using provided data. When
it comes to raw network traces produced by TCP/IP side channel scans such as in
this thesis, there are a number of tradeoﬀs to consider when releasing the data. By
obfuscating the IP address, but not the network that the IP is on and other important
topological information, various risks could be reduced without reducing the value of
the data. For example, the risk that listing the IPs of the clients makes them targets
for future studies could be mitigated through obfuscation. On the other hand, if
there is a risk that network administrators will mistakenly attribute communication
attempts to the client, having the raw data available through the IP address of
the measurement machine along with an explanation of data collection can help the
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owners of client machines to make the case that they did not initiate communication.
We leave a release of our raw data and the associated ethical concerns for future
work.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
The thesis statement that this dissertation began with is: because modern network
stacks have shared resources, there is a wealth of information that can be inferred
oﬀ-path by both attackers and Internet measurement researchers.
We showed that current designs of network protocols are susceptible to side channels that leak information. We built practical methods—in the form of idle scans—
that employ shared resources to learn about the communication status between remote hosts. In particular, we presented and evaluated a novel side channel based on
the Linux kernel’s SYN backlog which enables indirect detection of packet loss. We
then explained our hybrid idle scan which is a non-intrusive method for detecting
intentional packet drops between two IP addresses on the Internet where neither is a
measurement machine. We applied intervention analysis based on an autoregressivemoving-average model to increase the practicality of our techniques even in the face
of traﬃc noise. We then described the real-world application of the SYN backlog
and hybrid and idle scans to a large-scale Internet measurement problem in which
we measured the connectivity between the Tor anonymity network and clients in
China. These techniques enabled us to increase the community’s understanding of
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how the GFW is architected and how its blocking of the Tor network looks from
diﬀerent clients all over China. Thus the above thesis statement was demonstrated
to be true.

8.1

Future Work

The research presented in this thesis can be continued in many directions. With
respect to ethical concerns, we plan to explore the idea of using routers with a global
IPID as a client. That way, no individual end user can possibly experience negative
consequences for unsolicited traﬃc, which would make our measurements even safer
for users. We conducted an initial and promising study to investigate the possibility
of ﬁnding global IPID routers. A more detailed experiment needs to be performed,
however.
Another research direction can be to analyze censorship for popular domains
using side channels. The goal could be to create a comprehensive, real-time, and
global view of the censorship of popular domains which also makes it possible to
compare censorship incidents of countries. Only by using side channels, especially idle
scans, are we able to use geographically distributed machines, and we are no longer
limited to controlling limited vantage points. Such a system could be a signiﬁcant
contribution to longitudinal censorship measurement systems. Such longitudinal
studies are essential to understand global trends in Internet censorship practices.
With respect to the Great Firewall of China, we were able to prove and disprove
several hypotheses about its architecture. However, numerous questions still remain
unanswered, e.g.: 1) what role does BGP and routing in general play in the GFW?,
2) why does the GFW (mostly) only ﬁlter SYN/ACKs coming into the country from
Tor relays, but not SYNs or RSTs going out?, 3) are the routers that drop a Tor
relay’s SYN/ACKs the same routers that have port mirroring and do deep packet
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inspection?, 4) how and when is the GFW obtaining the Tor network consensus?, 5)
is active probing also happening for Tor relays?, and 6) has the blocking changed in
the past two years?
Finally, recall that our techniques are currently limited to testing basic IP connectivity. Thus, we can only detect censorship on lower layers of the network stack,
i.e., before a TCP connection is even established. To overcome this limitation, future work could focus on ﬁnding more side channels that can be used in higher layers
of the network stack. Such side channels would signiﬁcantly improve measurement
ﬂexibility and enable an entirely new array of measurements.
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